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Abstract: In this paper we address the issue of multilateralism versus bilateralism
in a situation where a home government’s optimal policy is time-inconsistent and
the time-consistent policy sub-optimal. Short-run production and wage rigidities
create incentive for the government to surprise private agents, ex post, with exces-
sive protection. The problem is shown to be particularly severe when the intended
beneﬁciaries (members of the lobby) cannot coordinate on their (investment) deci-
sions fully. A commitment to multilateral free trade may then be welfare enhancing
and politically feasible. However, once a discriminatory Preferential Trade Agree-
ment is formed, it undermines any incentive for further multilateral trade liberal-
ization. Thus, we propose another reason why Article XXIV of GATT/WTO may
be a stumbling bloc for wider multilateral trade liberalization. Our result is based
on the trade deﬂection eﬀect and the market power eﬀect of Preferential Trade
Agreements.
Introduction
Two central issues in the context of discriminatory trade agreements
such as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are their static welfare impact
and the dynamic time path question. The former issue deals with whether
PTAs are trade creating or trade diverting and the welfare implication of this,
while the latter issue is concerned with the impact that such agreements may
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1have on the wider multilateral trade liberalization. In the context of the dy-
n a m i ct i m ep a t hq u e s t i o n ,w h i c hi st h ef o c u so ft h i sp a p e r ,t h el i t e r a t u r eh a s
highlighted three broad themes. The ﬁrst theme focuses on how the internal
political support for multilateral trade liberalization is aﬀected by regional
integration (Levy, 1997)1. The second theme deals with how regional agree-
ments alter the bargaining outcomes across countries in multilateral trade
negotiations (Ludema, 1993). The third theme considers the impact of such
agreements on the enforcement of multilateral trade cooperation (Bagwell
and Staiger, 1997a, 1997b, 1999b). These studies have shown that regional
agreements are a mixed bag for multilateralism. That is, while in some cases
they further the cause of multilateralism, in others, they undermine it. Or,
in Bhagwati’s (1991) terminology, PTAs could be either building blocs or
stumbling blocs for the wider multilateral cooperative eﬀorts.
The stumbling-building blocs literature has focused primarily on the
magnitude of trade liberalization rather than on eﬃciency. It does not pro-
vide an answer as to why discriminatory agreements that are, for example,
stumbling blocs may reduce national or world eﬃciency. In fact, this problem
is quite pervasive and applies in general to the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
rule of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As Caplin and Krishna (1998,
pp. 281-282) note:
“There is a simple observation which illustrates the diﬃculties
in providing a general bargaining-theoretic rationale for MFN.
There is a grand utility possibility frontier available to countries
using all the commercial trading instruments at their disposal,
such as tariﬀs. If we view the bargaining process as yielding eﬃ-
cient outcome, as for example with the Nash bargaining solution,
then MFN simply limits the tools available to diﬀerent countries,
shifting in the utility possibility frontier. Hence the most posi-
tive aspects of MFN can only be illustrated when the bargaining
process absent-MFN yields ineﬃcient outcomes.”
1We use the terms regional integration, regionalism, discriminatory trade agreements
and bilateral agreements synonymously with PTAs.
2Some attempts have been made recently to address the concerns ex-
pressed above. McCalman (1998) explores the eﬃciency-enhancing role of
MFN when bargaining occurs with private information. Bagwell and Staiger
(1999c) analyze the commitment value of MFN when negotiations occur over
time. They show that MFN, together with reciprocity, can support eﬃcient
outcomes that would, absent-MFN, be time-inconsistent and hence not sus-
tainable. Further, Bagwell and Staiger (1999b) consider the enforcement
problem in a repeated game framework and demonstrate how discriminatory
agreements aﬀect the level of (eﬃciency enhancing) cooperation that can be
sustained at the multilateral level.
Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by Caplin and Krishna, we be-
lieve that the stumbling-building blocs literature serves to isolate and demon-
strate important issues and results which, when embedded in an environment
with ineﬃcient multilateral cooperation, can provide richer insights. While
the above-mentioned attempts are noteworthy and are important steps in
understanding the welfare implications of regionalism, they are still in their
infancy. For this reason, and to keep our model simple, we restrict our at-
tention to the impact of discriminatory liberalization (via Article XXIV) on
the incentive of a country to pursue further multilateral trade liberalization
in a magnitude-sense rather than eﬃciency-sense.2
Another concern that has occupied the attention of trade theorists and
policy makers is that optimal policies may be time-inconsistent. In fact,
Kydland and Prescott (1977) have argued that optimal policies are almost
always time-inconsistent and the time-consistent policies sub-optimal. A
number of papers have discussed this problem in the context of trade pol-
icy. Staiger and Tabellini (1987) show that a benevolent government with
redistributive goals will have an incentive to reverse its pre-announced tar-
iﬀ and surprise private agents with unanticipated protection. Under perfect
foresight, such temptations yield an equilibrium outcome with an excessively
high (sub-optimal) level of protection. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998)
consider the interaction between a government and its private agents in the
import-competing sector (the lobby) in a Nash bargaining framework. They
2See, for example, Levy 1997, for a similar approach.
3point out that when the government lacks credibility in setting trade pol-
icy it leads to an ineﬃciently over-sized import-competing sector that can
reduce the government’s overall welfare relative to free trade, the contribu-
tions from the lobby notwithstanding. As one may expect, the presence of
such commitment-related ineﬃciencies creates an incentive for the govern-
ment to seek suitable credibility-enhancing devices. Staiger and Tabellini
consider the choice between committing, ex ante,t oat a r i ﬀ-only versus a
subsidy-only regime, while Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare focus on free trade
agreements as possible remedies. Both these papers focus on “domestic”
commitment problems. That is, the credibility problem between the gov-
ernment and its own (domestic) private agents. In contrast to this, Lapan
(1988), Bagwell and Staiger (1999c) deal with commitment problems between
the governments across countries.
The present paper attempts at establishing a link between domestic com-
m i t m e n tp r o b l e m sa n dt h ei m p a c to fr e g i o n a la g r e e m e n t so nt h ef u n c t i o n -
ing of the multilateral trading system. We consider a two-goods and three-
country model. There are two foreign and one home countries. Throughout
the paper our focus is on the home country. Production of each good in the
home country requires a sector-speciﬁc factor and a common factor which is
called labor. That is, labor can be used in either sector. The wage rate of
labor and its allocation across the two sectors are determined endogenously
through a perfectly competitive labor market. Following the political econ-
omy literature, we assume that owners of the speciﬁc factor in home’s import-
competing sector are politically organized and constitute a lobby. The home
government maximizes a weighted average of (pure) national welfare and the
welfare of the lobby. A critical feature of our model is that the home coun-
try is characterized by short-run rigidity in the wage rate and inter-sectoral
mobility of labor. That is, we assume that while labor is perfectly mobile
in the long-run, it is inter-sectorally immobile in the short-run. Similarly,
the wage rate is assumed to be perfectly ﬂexible in the long-run, but rigid in
the short-run. This structure is quite standard in the trade literature except
that we allow for wage rigidity as well. The motivation for this is discussed
in detail in the sections that follow.
The presence of the above-mentioned rigidities implies that while output
4in each sector and the wage rate are ﬂexible ex ante and before trade policy is
implemented, they are ﬁxed when trade policy is implemented and thereafter
(ex post). Since a fully anticipated increase in home’s tariﬀsl e a d st oaw e l f a r e
loss due to the conventional production distortion of a tariﬀ, optimal policy
t a k e st h i sc o s ti n t oa c c o u n t . 3 However, ex post, this cost is absent since pro-
duction is ﬁxed due to the labor-immobility mentioned above. Consequently,
the government has an incentive to revise its pre-announced policy and sur-
prise private agents with a higher level of protection. Thus, optimal policy
is time-inconsistent. Foreseeing this, private agents employ more resources
(labor) in the import-competing sector. The resulting equilibrium features
an ineﬃciently high level of protection and an ineﬃciently over-sized import-
competing sector. This constitutes one source of the commitment-related
ineﬃciencies in our model.4 The second source of commitment-related ineﬃ-
ciencies in our model is due to the short-run wage rigidity and the structure
of the labor market. To see this, we ﬁr s tn o t et h a to u ra s s u m p t i o no fp e r -
fectly competitive labor market implies that the lobby is non-monopsonistic.
That is, while its members are able to overcome the free rider problem to
inﬂuence trade policy, they do not coordinate on their (labor-hiring) deci-
sions in the labor market. This leads to excessive competition between the
members of the lobby for scarce labor with the resulting equilibrium wage
higher than the monopsonistic-wage. From the government’s point of view
this “higher” wage constitutes a distortion since it attaches a higher weight
to the welfare of the lobby vis-a-vis the laborers. A fully anticipated increase
in home’s future tariﬀ increases demand for labor in the import-competing
sector and thus enhances this distortion. Consequently, some of the beneﬁts
of protection are dissipated away from the lobby and towards labor. This re-
duces the home government’s overall (and marginal) beneﬁt from protection.
We interpret this “dissipation of rents” as an extra cost that the government
encounters when protection is fully anticipated. For brevity, will refer to
this extra cost as the wage distortion of a fully anticipated increase in future
protection. However, ex post, this cost is completely absent since the wage
rate is rigid in the short-run. Incentive for surprise protection follows from
this. This renders the optimal policy time-inconsistent. As we show in the
3Throughout the paper the term “optimal policy” will mean the “full commitment
optimal policy” or the “ex ante optimal policy”. This is consistent with the convention in
the literature.
4This source of commitment problem has been widely discussed in the literature. See,
for example, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, Staiger and Tabellini.
5sections, the time-consistent equilibrium features excessive protection and
a distorted wage rate which reduces the home government’s overall welfare
relative to the full-commitment case. We may note here that if the lobby be-
haved as a monopsonistic buyer in the labor market then the wage rate will
be set optimally from the lobby’s and the government’s point of view. There
w i l lb en o“ d i s t o r t i o n ”i nt h ew a g er a t ei nt h i sc a s ea n dt h u s ,s h o r t - r u nw a g e
rigidity will cease to be a source of commitment problem. We establish this
argument formally in section 3 where we show that a necessary condition for
commitment-related ineﬃciencies to arise from short-run wage rigidity is that
the lobby is non-monopsonistic in the labor market. A related result here is
that, in contrast to the ﬁndings in the literature, commitment problems can
arise purely due to wage distortion even though production distortion may
be completely absent.
Faced with these commitment-related ineﬃciencies the home govern-
ment seeks suitable commitment-enhancing devices to bind its trade policy.
As in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, we consider the use of free trade agree-
ments as commitment-enhancing devices. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the
government can commit itself to free trade agreements before private agents
make their decisions and that such agreements are fully binding in the future.
In this context we focus on two types of (free) trade agreements. That is,
the home government can choose either a multilateral (non-discriminatory)
free trade agreement or a bilateral (discriminatory) one in the form of a PTA
with one of its trading partners. An important feature of such commitment-
enhancing trade agreements is that they are trade-liberalizing as they require
free trade between the member countries. The focus of the paper is to study
whether this trade-liberalizing eﬀect translates into multilateral trade lib-
eralization and whether the bilateral option helps or hinders this process.
In other words, when trade liberalization is driven by credibility enhancing
concerns then does the PTA-option act as a stumbling or a building bloc for
wider multilateral trade liberalization? Before elaborating on the motivation
for focusing on free trade agreements as commitment-enhancing devices, it
will be helpful to discuss a real world example.
It is argued that for Mexico the most important aspect of joining the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is that it will provide credi-
6bility to its trade liberalization policy. Expressing this optimism, an executive
from a pulp mill in Chihuahua, Mexico, said:
“Policies in Mexico have always changed when presidents did, but
free trade gives a sense or permanence to the very sound policies
of this administration.”5
Such credible trade agreements not only reduce protectionist forces in the
short run but generate trade-liberalizing forces in the long run too. For
instance, Gould (1992, p.22) states that:
“The beneﬁt of the proposed free trade agreement between the
United States, Canada and Mexico will derive from not only a
decrease in tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers but also from a credible
commitment that future trade barriers will not be erected. It is
the expectation of lasting free trade, in addition to low trade bar-
riers, that will entice long-term investment away from protected
import-competing sectors and into the export sectors where a
country’s comparative advantage lies.”
A relevant question to ask here is about the commitment value of WTO-
bindings as compared to explicit trade agreements like NAFTA. That is, why
couldn’t Mexico use its tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ bindings at WTO as an eﬀective
commitment device against the domestic protectionist forces? Do regional
agreements have a higher commitment value than WTO-bindings?
The statements cited above seem to suggest that this may be the case, at
least for Mexico. While GATT/WTO has been successful in lowering trade
5Rodolfo Figueroa of Grupo Chihuahua, quoted in “Latin Turnaround”, Wall Street
Journal, May 24, 1991, p1.
7barriers through successive rounds of negotiations, however, its members con-
tinue to use the safeguard provisions to restrict trade when domestic pressure
for protection rises. Use of Antidumping duties, Voluntary Export Restraints
and other “grey-area” measures still continues. For instance, Staiger (1995,
p. 1538) states:
“If the extended decline in multilateral tariﬀ levels represents one
major feature of post-war trade policy, the move toward “special”
protection which has accompanied it represents a second. ... the
possibility of temporary reversions to high protection or on occa-
sion even permanent reversal of previous reductions was antici-
pated to be a part of the natural process of liberalization, and was
viewed as an inevitable consequence of low levels of baseline pro-
tection envisioned by GATT. But while the safeguards included
in GATT rules were meant to keep the inevitable deviations from
rigid tariﬀ bindings within GATT rules, in practice the growing
use of VERs, VIEs, OMAs, and tariﬀ programs that are tailor
made to suit the needs of particular sectors signals a failure of
the rules to contain these actions, and has given rise to the term
“managed trade”.”
Further, referring to the theoretical l i t e r a t u r eo nc o m m i t m e n tp r o b l e m si n
trade policy, he states (Staiger, 1995, p. 1540):
“But while these papers all suggest that GATT rules could be
helpful as a commitment device when confronting injured sectors,
it is in precisely these situations that GATT commitments can be
suspended under the safeguard provisions of the agreements.”6
6Staiger refers to Staiger and Tabellini (1987), Matsuyama (1990), Brainard (1994) and
Mayer (1994) here.
8From the discussion above we may infer that countries may seek options
beyond WTO-bindings to enhance the credibility of their trade policies. We
refer to these as explicit trade agreements with NAFTA as a prime example.
As discussed above, we restrict our attention to those agreements which re-
quire complete elimination of all trade barriers between countries that join
the agreement.7 Such agreements may be built, at the outset, with strin-
gent safeguards which would make them diﬃcult to be exploited, ex post,
for “special-interest” concerns. This point has been noted in the literature.
For example, explaining the widespread use of escape clauses and safeguard
actions granted to troubled industries, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998, p.
595) state:
“Second, our model examines a government’s demand for com-
mitment to free trade; therefore, an alternative interpretation of
the observed exceptions to free-trade agreements is that the in-
ternational organization may notb es t r o n ge n o u g ht oe n f o r c ef r e e
trade under all circumstances. It is conceivable, for example, that
NAFTA grants fewer exceptions than the WTO because enforce-
ment in NAFTA is more eﬀective.”
We would like to mention here that we do not imply that regional agree-
ments or explicit trade agreements are necessarily and always more credible
than WTO-bindings. Instead, we intend to restrict our attention to the sce-
nario where a country seeks explicit (free) trade agreements precisely when
these are better enforceable than the WTO-bindings. A full analysis of this
issue, while interesting in itself is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Our focus is on the implications for the conduct of trade policy in a situation
where explicit trade agreements are desired for their commitment value. Al-
ternatively, we may interpret our model as one involving two broad regime
choices for a country: it can either opt for a regime characterized by fully
credible explicit free trade agreement with any of its trading partner(s), or
7GATT/WTO rules require that a trade agreement outside the usual negotiating rounds
must ensure complete elimination of all trade barriers between the countries involved in
the agreement.
9it may choose to conduct trade negotiations at the WTO negotiating-rounds
without any prior commitment about the degree of trade liberalization that
would be reached.8
Before proceeding further, it will be useful to summarize the basic ar-
guments in the following simple points:
(a) Government’s face credibility problems vis-a-vis their domes-
tic private agents in setting their trade policy. This leads to
a welfare loss through a sub-optimally high level of protection.
Commitment-enhancing devices can help reduce this ineﬃciency.
(b) When WTO-bindings do not serve as eﬀective commitment
devices a government may seek explicit free trade agreements that
are durable and better enforceable. These agreements could be
either multilateral (non-discriminatory) or bilateral (discrimina-
tory).
(c) Such trade agreements can help a government foreclose polit-
ical pressure and reduce the ineﬃciency mentioned in (a) above.
(d) In light of these observations this paper seeks to address ques-
tions of the following kind: If the option of joining a discrimina-
tory agreement like NAFTA were not available to Mexico, then
w o u l di tc o m m i tt ow o r l d - w i d ef r e et r a d et oo v e r c o m ei t sc o m -
mitment problems? Having joined NAFTA, what incentive does
Mexico have to pursue multilateral free trade to further bind its
trade policy against the domestic protectionist forces? In gen-
eral, we analyze whether discriminatory trade agreements are
stumbling or building blocs when trade agreements are sought
primarily to overcome domestic commitment problems.
8The literature on trade policy has frequently utilized such distinctions between WTO-
bindings and explicit (regional) agreements. For instance, models dealing with enforcement
problems in a repeated game framework have typically assumed that regional agreements
(with free trade within the bloc) are strictly binding while inter-bloc tariﬀsm u s tb es e l f -
enforcing. See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1999b); Bond, Syropoulos and Winters
(2001).
10The bridge between domestic commitment problem and PTAs being
stumbling or building blocs can be easily summarized by ﬁrst noting that
a PTA between home and, for example, country A produces the market
power eﬀect and the trade deﬂection eﬀect. The former implies that the
PTA increases home’s market power in trade against the non-member coun-
try which generates larger term-of-trade related gains from protectionism for
home against the non-member country. The trade deﬂection eﬀect arises
because a higher tariﬀ by home on its imports from the non-member coun-
try shifts its equilibrium import-volume away from the non-member country
and towards the member country. With discriminatory tariﬀsi np l a c e ,t h i s
r e d u c e sh o m e ’ st o t a lt a r i ﬀ revenue and thus its (marginal and total) beneﬁt
from protectionism.
The basic results and structure of the paper can be summarized using
the elements stated above as follows. We ﬁrst show that commitment prob-
lem is necessary for a government to seek a multilateral free trade agreement
(Proposition 2). Next, we identify suﬃcient conditions when, absent-PTA
option, such a multilateral agreement is preferred over no trade agreement
(Proposition 2). This holds when commitment ineﬃciency is suﬃciently large
relative to beneﬁts (terms-of-trade and political) from an active protectionist
policy. These results imply that, absent PTA-option, a worldwide multilat-
eral free trade would result. We next allow for the bilateral option. Our
r e s u l t ss h o wt h a ti fh o m ef o r m saP T Aw i t has u ﬃciently large country then
the trade deﬂection eﬀect eliminates its commitment problem (Proposition
3). This occurs because, ex post,t h etrade deﬂection eﬀect increases home’s
cost of revision in its (ex ante optimal) tariﬀ suﬃciently so that the full com-
mitment optimal protection level is time-consistent too. Simultaneously, the
market power eﬀect ensures that home’s beneﬁt from an active protectionist
policy against the non-member country is strictly positive, the higher cost
due to the trade deﬂection eﬀect notwithstanding (Proposition 4). Conse-
quently, absent-PTA option, home has incentive to liberalize multilaterally;
however, once a PTA is formed, this incentive is completely eliminated and
an active protectionist policy against the non-member country is instead cho-
sen. Thus, domestic commitment problems render PTAs stumbling blocs for
wider multilateral trade liberalization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we
11introduce the basic elements of the model. In section 2 we derive the time-
consistent equilibrium solution for various trading regimes that we consider.
The commitment problem and the full commitment optimal policy is derived
in section 3. Putting these elements together we state our main results in
the same section. In the conclusion we discuss some generalizations of the
model and related issues.
Section 1: The model
We assume that there is one home country and two foreign countries.
The foreign countries are called A and B. There are two goods labelled X
and Y. To simplify the exposition of our ﬁndings we suppose that each
foreign country trades only with the home country, who imports X from
each of its two foreign trading partners in exchange for exports of Y. The
home country is thus the only country that has the opportunity to choose
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory trade agreements.9 To focus
on the link between domestic commitment problems and demand for trade
agreements we assume that the tariﬀs of the foreign countries are zero. Home
country will demand free trade agreement if and only if its commitment-
related ineﬃciency is suﬃciently large. In the conclusion we discuss how the
qualitative nature of our results can be extended when the foreign countries
set their tariﬀso p t i m a l l y .
We now introduce the price notations. The home local relative price
is denoted as p ≡ px/py, where px(py) is the local price of good X(Y) in
the home country. Similarly, the local relative price in foreign country J




y) is the local price of good X(Y)
in foreign country J =A,B. We deﬁne the “world” (i.e., untaxed) relative
9High transportation costs between the two foreign countries may render trade infea-
sible between them. While our results do not depend on this assumption, it allows us to
keep the model simple and draw sharp results. Similar structure has been used in the
literature. See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger, 1999c.
12price for trade between home and foreign country J as pw
J ≡ pJ
x/py. This is
the ratio of exporter prices for trade between home and foreign country J.
We will refer to it as home’s bilateral terms-of-trade with foreign country J.
Home’s tariﬀ on its imports from foreign country J is denoted by TJ which
is assumed to be a non-negative speciﬁct a r i ﬀ. Throughout we will focus on
the non-prohibitive values of TJ. We deﬁne its value in terms of good Y as
tJ ≡ TJ/py. Home’s good Y is used as a common numeraire throughout the
model.10 We rule out export subsidies.
1.1 Endowments and Consumer preferences
The total number (measure) of agents, and equivalently consumers, in
t h eh o m ec o u n t r yi sd e n o t e db yL and in foreign country J by LJ. Con-
sumers in the world have identical preferences given by the utility function
u(cix,c iy) ≡ αcix − (1/2)c2
ix + ciy where cix(ciy) is the consumption level of
good X(Y) by the ith consumer and α is a strictly positive parameter.11
Individual demand function for good X in the home country is given by
cix(p) ≡ α − p and in foreign country J by cix(pJ) ≡ α − pJ.
To derive the remaining structure we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the endowments
and production process in the three countries. To this end, we assume that
t h et w of o r e i g nc o u n t r i e sa r ep u r ee x c h a n g ee c o n o m i e sw i t haﬁxed endow-
ment of the two goods. Each agent in foreign country J is endowed with xJ
units of good X and yJ units of good Y. National income of foreign country
J when measured in terms of good Y is equal to IJ ≡ LJ(yJ+pJxJ).P r o d u c -
tion in the home country is endogenously determined within a speciﬁcf a c t o r s
framework with R,K and L being the three factors of production. We assume
that R(K) is a speciﬁc factor used in the production of good X(Y) only. L is
the common of production in the two sectors and is interpreted to be either
labor or as another input. The total amount (measure) of factors R,K and L
is exogenously given and denoted by R,K and L, respectively. Let Lx(Ly) de-
note the amount of labor employed in sector X(Y) i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .A s -
suming constant returns to scale production function in each sector, we have
10Since home’s tariﬀs are assumed to be non-prohibitive and foreign tariﬀs are zero,
it follows that the absolute price of good Y will be equal across the three countries in
equilibrium. Hence, we can use any country’s good Y as our common numeraire.
11The symmetry of consumer preferences is not important for our results.
13that output of good X i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ye q u a l sF = F(Lx) ≡ Lb1
x R1−b1
and that of good Y is equal to G = G(Ly) ≡ Lb2
y K1−b2. The parameter b1 is
treated as exogenously given with 0 <b 1 < 1. The same holds for b2. We may
note here that with constant returns to scale in each sector the speciﬁcf a c -
tors are always fully utilized in equilibrium. We have imposed this restriction
in the output levels deﬁned above in the F(.) and G(.) functions. Marginal
productivity of labor in sector X,Y is given by F0(Lx) ≡ ∂F(Lx)/∂Lx and
G0(Ly) ≡ ∂G(Ly)/∂Ly, respectively. For future use let F00 ≡ ∂2F(.)/∂L2
x < 0
and G00 ≡ ∂2G(.)/∂L2
y < 0.
We next introduce the following notations:
f ≡ F/L which is home’s average (per home-agent) output of good X
MJ ≡ home’s import-volume of good X from foreign country J = A,B
TR ≡ home’s total tariﬀ revenue measured in terms of good Y which is
assumed to be distributed back to home’s consumers (agents) in lump-sum
fashion.
Indirect utility of the ith agent in the home country with income level
Ii equals Ii + s(p) where s(p) ≡ (α − p)2/2 and is the agent’s (consumer)
surplus from the consumption of the non-numeraire good. Home’s national
income, inclusive of tariﬀ r e v e n u ei fa n ya n dm e a s u r e di nt e r m so fg o o dY,
is equal to I ≡ G + pF + TR. National welfare of the home country is the
aggregate of (indirect) utility of all its agents and equals V ≡ I + Ls(p).
F r o mt h ea b o v es t r u c t u r ew ec a nc o m p u t et h ea g g r e g a t ed e m a n d ,e x p o r t
supply and import demand functions in each country for the two goods as
follows:
Cx(p) ≡ L(α − p) is home’s aggregate demand for good X
EJ ≡ LJ(xJ − α + pJ) is foreign country J0s export supply function
M ≡ MA + MB = L(α − p − f) is home’s import demand function
CJx(pJ) ≡ LJ(α − pJ) is foreign country J0s aggregate demand for good X
Home’s aggregate demand for good Y equals I − pCx(p) and the same for
foreign country J equals IJ − pJLJ(α − pJ).
141.2 Relative size of the three countries
T h er e l a t i v es i z eo fe a c hc o u n t r yi sd e ﬁned as the number of agents
in the country relative to the whole world. Home’s (relative) size equals
λ ≡ L/(L + LA + LB), and similarly for foreign country J this equals λJ ≡
LJ(L+LA +LB). T h e r ew i l lb en oh a r mi nn o r m a l i z i n gt h et o t a ln u m b e ro f
agents in the world to unity although it will not be necessary. Throughout
the paper we will mean by the “size” of a country as the relative size of the
country.
1.3 Description of the home country and the structure of the game
Structure of the home country is characterized by a three-stage game
which are as follows:
Stage 1
In the ﬁr s ts t a g et h eh o m ec o u n t r y ’ sg o v e rnment decides whether to form
a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with both A and B, or a PTA with coun-
try A only or no agreement at all.12 Throughout the model we will refer to
these three possibilities as the “FTA regime”, “PTA regime” and the “MFN
regime”, respectively. To focus on the incentive-structure of the home coun-
try we assume that if an FTA or PTA oﬀer is made to either A or B (or
both, as the case may be) then it will be readily accepted by them. Trading
regime (FTA, PTA or MFN regime) chosen in this stage is fully binding in
the future as discussed in the Introduction. The outcome of stage 1 is fully
observed by all the private agents.
Stage 2
Owners of the speciﬁc factors and laborers negotiate over wages and employ-
ment in a perfectly competitive environment. Firms (owners of factors R, K)
decide how much labor to hire and workers decide in which sector to work.
Wages are determined through competitive bidding. We introduce two fea-
tures which will be critical for our model. (i) Firstly, we assume that labor,
while mobile in stage 2, however, is immobile (across sectors) in stage 3. (ii)
Wages negotiated and accepted in stage 2 are irreversible in stage 3 in the
sense discussed below. These two constitute the two rigidities in our model.
Two key points ought to be noted here. Firstly, in the context of our model,
12There is no loss of generailty in choosing country A only as home’s possible PTA-
partner.
15it is important that wages are not ﬁx e de n t i r e l yi nt e r m so fg o o dX alone.
In our model they are ﬁx e di nt e r m so ft h en u m e r a i r eg o o dY.H o w e v e r ,
it will not make any qualitative diﬀerence to our results if they were ﬁxed
in terms of both the goods. Secondly, complete short-run rigidity in labor
movement (across sectors) and wages is not essential. Even small levels of
rigidities would suﬃce for all our results.13
A simple motivation for the rigidities mentioned above could be that the
process of hiring labor and negotiating wages takes time and cannot be done
in stage 3 which is a short-run period. Other motivations can be explored.
We outline one alternative structure below and argue that the equilibrium
reached therein is exactly the same as with (i) and (ii) above.
Consider an alternative structure where labor is inter-sectorally mobile
in the long-run (stage 2) but immobile in the short-run (stage 3). This may
be due to, for instance, sector speciﬁc training costs which are prohibitively
high in the short-run but negligible in the long-run. We assume that the
market for labor is perfectly competitive and all ﬁrms within each sector are
symmetric. Labor is hired on a contractual basis. A contract between a ﬁrm
and a laborer speciﬁes the wage rate and a promise to supply labor for one
period of time. We allow ﬁrms to hire labor in stage 2 as well as in stage 3.
Note that in stage 3 a ﬁrm can increase its labor force by extracting laborers
from another ﬁrm in the same sector only since inter-sectoral movement of
labor is ruled out in stage 3. We assume that labor contracts, once agreed
upon, cannot be revoked in the future except in the following two situations.
The ﬁrst situation is when the total earnings of a ﬁr m( d e t e r m i n e di ns t a g e
3) are less than its total cost of labor. We assume that in such a scenario
the ownership of the speciﬁcf a c t o ro ft h eﬁrm is transferred to its laborers.
The second situation arises from our assumption that if a ﬁrm wants to sell
its labor force to another ﬁrm then it is perfectly free to do so, provided
that the laborers are paid the wage rate agreed upon previously. Note that
given the symmetry of ﬁrms within each sector, inter-sectoral immobility
of labor in stage 3, atomistic agents, perfect foresight with no uncertainty
13Small levels of rigidities can modeled by simply allowing for slightly higher cost in
revising the wage rate and in moving labor across sectors in the short-run as compared to
the long-run. We believe this to be consistent with the real world.
16or incomplete information, it follows that in equilibrium neither of these
two cases would arise. This structure is equivalent to assuming that on
accepting a contract, the ﬁrm pays an amount to the laborer and in return
the ownership of labor (services) is transferred to the ﬁrm for one period
of time. Hence, any gain (or loss) in the value of labor (after a contract is
signed and accepted) accrues fully to the employers.14 This is a simplifying
assumption and all our results will continue to hold even otherwise provided
that ﬁrms in the import-competing sector share some part of these gains
(positive or negative). A suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o rt h i si st h a tw a g e sa r en o t
ﬁx e di nt e r m so fg o o dX alone. Hence, our assumption that wages are ﬁxed
in terms of good Y alone should be viewed as a simplifying assumption. The
equilibrium in the factor market here is characterized by ﬁrms hiring all their
labor force in stage 2, no inter-sectoral movement of labor in stage 3, given
symmetry of ﬁrms in each sector there will be no intra-sectoral movement of
labor and wages in stage 3 and, ﬁrms will ﬁnd it optimal to use all the labor
that they hire in stage 2. This equilibrium is exactly the same as under (i)
and (ii) above.
Rigidities in wages (and other prices) have been considered by econo-
m i s t sa sa ni m p o r t a n tr e a s o nf o rs u r p r i s ep o l i c ys h o c k sr e n d e r i n go p t i m a l
policies time-inconsistent. While this issue has occupied center-stage in the
macroeconomics literature, it has been largely neglected by the (commit-
ment related) literature in trade policy. Our motivation in incorporating
wage rigidities is that wages are critical in determining the distribution of
income (or equivalently, the size of “political contributions” as in Gross-
man and Helpman, 1994, 1995) which plays a central role in determining
optimal policies. We show that anticipated and surprise policy shocks have
diﬀerent eﬀects on equilibrium wages and thus on a government’s overall wel-
fare. Commitment related ineﬃciencies and demand for credibility-enhancing
trade agreements can arise purely due to wage rigidities even though the con-
ventional production distortion of tariﬀs may be completely absent.15
14The change in the value of labor may arise due to, for example, unanticipated price
shocks in the future.
15The literature dealing with commitment problems in trade policy has exclusively fo-
cused on short-run production rigidities and the conventional production distortion of the
tariﬀ as the reason why a government may prefer surprise protection to fully anticipated
one. We suggest that wage rigidities and wage distortion in the sense discussed in this
17Stage 3
In this stage trade policy is implemented, previously accepted labor contracts
are fulﬁlled as discussed above, production is realized, markets for the two
goods are cleared and equilibrium established. Consumption occurs and
welfare of all agents is realized. We assume that all this occurs simultaneously
as the sequential structure here is irrelevant. Markets for the two goods are
assumed to be perfectly competitive. Implementation of trade policy in this
stage is governed by two simple rules: ﬁrstly, trade agreements reached in
stage 1 (FTA or PTA) are binding and duly implemented; secondly, home’s
tariﬀs on the non-member countries (if any) are set optimally from the home
government’s point of view and are strictly MFN. Thus, a PTA is the only
form of discrimination that is allowed in our model. The ﬁr s tr u l ei si r r e l e v a n t
for our MFN regime, while the MFN restriction in the second rule is irrelevant
for the PTA regime. To determine home’s optimal tariﬀ on the non-member
countries we introduce the home government’s objective function.
Home government’s preferences
Following the political economy literature, we model the home govern-
ment’s objective function as politically motivated. That is, we assume that
the government maximizes a weighted average of national welfare and the
welfare of special interest groups.16 Speciﬁcally, we consider the case when
owners of the speciﬁc factor R in the import-competing sector are politically
organized. We assume that they can overcome the free-rider problem and
constitute a lobby to inﬂuence their government’s trade policy. While we do
not explicitly model political contributions oﬀered by the lobby to the gov-
ernment, our approach is equivalent (reduced form) to the one in Grossman
and Helpman (1994, 1995). For simplicity, we will assume that the owner-
ship of factor R is highly concentrated so that the total earnings of the lobby
is simply the total producer surplus in sector X.17 We will denote this by
r ≡ pF − wLx where w ≡ equilibrium wage rate determined endogenously
in the model.
paper can be equally important if the government is sensitive to the distribution of income.
16For discussion of this literature, see Bagwell and Staiger 1999a, 2002 (Chapter 2). The
formulation adopted here is analogous to those used by Bagwell and Staiger 2001,2003 and
Baldwin 1987.
17This assumption is explored in Grossman and Helpman, 1994, pp. 846-847.
18Home government’s overall welfare equals
Ω ≡ V + βr
where β is a non-negative parameter (weight) and captures the government’s
political preference. A higher value of β implies that the government is
more concerned about the lobby’s welfare relative to (pure) national welfare.
Equilibrium values of V,r are derived in the next section. We may note here
that the members of the lobby are atomistic in the labor market and do not
coordinate their (labor-hiring) decisions. That is, they are assumed to be
competitive and not monopsonistic in the labor market. For future reference
we will call this the non-monopsonistic nature of the lobby.
We now proceed to section 2 to establish the equilibrium of the game
and interpret its properties.
S e c t i o n2 :S o l u t i o no ft h eg a m e
We solve the model using backward induction method. It will be con-
venient to ﬁrst derive the expressions for equilibrium prices and trading vol-
umes for arbitrary values of tA,t B,f,G,w,L x. We will call this the trading
equilibrium of the game. The solution will allow us to solve easily for the
equilibrium in each trading regime from a common uniﬁed structure.
2.1 Trading equilibrium
Let τ ≡ (tA,t B) denote an arbitrary vector of home’s tariﬀs. Treat
τ,f,G,w,L x as exogenously given and ﬁxed for the time being. Equilibrium
values of the good’s prices and trade-volumes can be solved for from the
following market clearing and linkage conditions:
19L(α − p − f)=LA(xA − α + pA)+LB(xB − α + pB)
p = tA + pw
J and pJ = pw
J J = A,B
T h el e f t - h a n d - s i d e( L H S )o ft h eﬁrst of the previous two conditions is home’s
import demand function for good X and the right-hand-side (RHS) of the
same is the total export-supply of good X by the two foreign countries. The
second condition is the usual linkage condition connecting home’s equilibrium
local price and the bilateral world prices.
Equilibrium values of the endogenous variables described above are de-
noted and given by the following functions:
p = p(τ,f) ≡ α − (λf + λAxA + λBxB)+λAtA + λBtB ......(1)
pw
J = pw
J(τ,f) ≡ α − (λf + λAxA + λBxB) − (1 − λJ)tJ + λiti i 6= J = A,B
pJ = pJ(τ,f) ≡ pw
J(τ,f)
M = M(τ,f) ≡ L(λAxA + λBxB − (1 − λ)f − λAtA − λBtB)
EJ = EJ(τ,f) ≡ LJ(xJ−(λf+λAxA+λBxB)−(1−λJ)tJ+λiti) i 6= J = A,B
λf +λAxA+λBxB is the average endowment of good X in the world and α is
the average world demand for good X when its price is equal to zero in each
of the three countries. We assume that the latter is strictly higher than the
former so that under free trade all equilibrium prices and strictly positive.
For the remainder of the paper we will use the notation p to mean home’s
local (relative) equilibrium price as deﬁned by equation (1) above. Similarly,
pJ,p w
J,M,E J will mean equilibrium values of these variables as deﬁned above
by pJ(.),p w
J(.),M(.) and EJ(.) functions, respectively.
20We now proceed to solve for the equilibrium of the stage-game described
in section 1.
2.2 MFN regime solution
In stage 3 production takes place in the home country, labor contracts
(payment of wages) are fulﬁl l e d ,t h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n ti m p l e m e n t si t so p t i m a l
MFN tariﬀ and markets are cleared. Since production levels of X,Y are
completely determined by decisions made in stage 2 of the game, we treat
these as ﬁxed here. The solution of stage 3 will be complete by deriving
home’s ex post optimal tariﬀ and computing equilibrium prices and trade-
volumes. To this end, home’s ex post optimal MFN tariﬀ is given by the
solution to the following optimization problem:
Maximize pF + tAEA + tBEB + Ls(p)+βpF
by choosing tA,t B subject to the constraint that tA = tB,p= p(.), EJ = EJ(.)
J =A,B as derived above and F treated as exogenously ﬁxed.
The ﬁrst order optimization condition for the ex post optimal MFN tariﬀ,





















LHS of equation (2A) is the net beneﬁt to the home government from a
u n i ti n c r e a s ei ni t sM F Nt a r i ﬀ with F,G,w treated as ﬁxed and all changes
evaluated at the margin. It is decomposed into the following familiar terms.
The ﬁrst two terms together capture the change in home’s total tariﬀ revenue,
the third term is the change in producer surplus in sector X weighted by 1+β
to reﬂect the government’s political preference. The last term is the change
in consumer surplus from the consumption of good X i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .
21It can be easily checked that the second order maximization condition is
satisﬁed. For interior solution conditions see Appendix (A5).
Dividing equation (2A) throughout by L and substituting the solution
from the trading equilibrium we get the following implicit solution for the
home’s ex post optimal MFN tariﬀ:
t = βf +[ λ/(1 − λ)]M(t,t,f)/L .......(2B)
It will be useful to state the explicit solution for the optimal tariﬀ as well.
That is, substituting for M(.) from section 2.1 in equation (2B) and rear-
ranging we get the explicit solution for t as:







We now proceed to solve for stage 2 of the game which will give us the
equilibrium value of f. Some important properties of equations (2B) and (3)
will be discussed after that.
In stage 2 of the game factor markets are cleared and equilibrium wage
rate and the allocation of labor across the two sectors in the home country
is determined. Decisions of private agents in this stage are based on their
expectations about the future equilibrium prices. To analyze this let pe ≡
the expectation that private agents hold (in stage 2) about home’s future
(stage 3) equilibrium local price. Factor market equilibrium is given by the
following no-arbitrage and full employment conditions18:
18Full employment of factors of production is guaranteed since the factor markets are
perfectly competitive and marginal productivity of each factor of production is strictly
positive given our simple Cobb-Douglas production functions in the two sectors.
22Lx + Ly = L, peF0(Lx)=w = G0(Ly)






Note that RHS of the previous equation is strictly and monotonically increas-
ing in Lx, it approaches zero as Lx approaches zero and approaches inﬁnity as
Lx approaches L. This implies that, for any given ﬁnite and strictly positive
value of pe, the solution value of Lx is well deﬁned, unique, strictly interior,
and strictly increasing in pe.
For convenience, let Lx(pe) ≡ value of Lx obtained by solving the previ-
ous equation. Using this we can state the solution values of Ly,w,f,F,Gas
functions of pe, respectively, as follows:
Ly(pe) ≡ L − Lx(pe)
w(pe) ≡ peb1[R/Lx(pe)]1−b1
f(pe) ≡ R1−b1[Lx(pe)]b1/L
F(Lx(pe)) = Lf(pe); G(Ly(pe)) = K1−b2[Ly(pe)]b2
It can be easily checked that dw(.)/dpe > 0 (with b2 > 0) and df (.)/dpe > 0.
Further, for any given pe > 0, Lx(pe),L y(pe),F(.),G(.) are homogenous of
degree one in R,K and L. Lastly, f(pe) and w(pe) are homogenous of degree
zero in R,K and L for any given pe > 0.
Time-consistent equilibrium in the MFN regime
Equilibrium value of pe is given by the dual condition that, ex post,
agents’ expectations are realized and the government does not have any in-
centive to surprise private agents. These dual conditions are captured by the
following equation which can be used to solve for the unique time-consistent
equilibrium value of pe in the MFN regime:
23pe = p(t(f(pe)),t(f(pe)),f(pe))
RHS of the previous equation can be read as follows. For any given value
of pe, we ﬁrst compute f(pe) from the factor market equilibrium conditions
stated above. Using this value of f we compute home’s ex post optimal tariﬀ,
t(f(pe)), from equation (3). Substituting these values of t,f in equation (1)
we get RHS of the previous equation which is simply home’s equilibrium local
price in the MFN regime with its domestic production of X,Y and the MFN
tariﬀ set optimally for any arbitrary value of pe. The equality of this with
LHS is to ensure that expectations are realized ex post.T h ev a l u eo fpe that
satisﬁes the previous equation is well deﬁned, unique and strictly interior.
For details, see Appendix A1.
L e tt h ev a l u eo fpe obtained from the previous equation be denoted by
p∗
mfn. Home’s time-consistent MFN tariﬀ is equal to t∗
mfn ≡ t(f(p∗
mfn)). The
solution value of t∗
mfn is well deﬁned, unique, stable and strictly positive. See
Appendix A2 and A5 for details. The time-consistent equilibrium values of
all the remaining endogenous variables can be derived by substituting t∗
mfn,
p∗
mfn in the factor market equilibrium and the trading equilibrium solution
outlined above.
We derived the time-consistent equilibrium above by ﬁrst locating the
ﬁxed point of the p(.) function in p,pe space. Equivalently, we could start
with expectations about the future MFN tariﬀ (instead of the local price)
and locate the equilibrium MFN tariﬀ as a ﬁxed point in t,te space. We
brieﬂy outline this procedure here as it will be useful in interpreting some
of the results later in the section. To this end, let te
J ≡ expectations that
agents hold (in stage 2) about home’s future tariﬀ on its imports from foreign
country J, with J =A,B. The MFN restriction will be imposed shortly. For
any arbitrary values of te
A,t e
B, expectations about future equilibrium price in
home’s local market must satisfy equation (1) in the sense that:
pe = α − (λf(pe)+λAxA + λBxB)+λAte
A + λBte
B
24The previous equation follows from the assumption that agents are rational
and use the “correct” model in predicting future (equilibrium) values of the
variables, which is equation (1) for home’s local price. From the previous
equation we can uniquely solve for pe as a function of te
A,t e
B. Let this solution
value be denoted by pe(te
A,t e
B), which is well deﬁned, interior and unique.19
Impose the MFN restriction so that te
A = te
B = te and pe = pe(te,t e). Home’s
ex post optimal MFN tariﬀ is equal to t(f(pe(te,t e))), where t(.) is as given
by equation (3). Time consistent MFN tariﬀ is given by the value of te that
solves: te = t(f(pe(te,t e))) which is the usual ﬁxed-point condition in t,te
space. It can be easily checked that the solution value of te obtained from
the previous equation is equal to t∗
mfn w h i c hw a sd e r i v e de a r l i e r . T h a ti s ,
t∗





We may note here that pe(.) is strictly and monotonically increasing in te.
That is, dpe(.)/dte =
1 − λ
1+λf0 > 0,f 0 ≡ df (pe)/dpe.
Interpretation of results
A convenient property of the solution stated above is that home’s ex
post optimal MFN tariﬀ for any given pe, the time-consistent MFN tar-
iﬀ, t∗
mfn, and, the time-consistent equilibrium values of all prices (local and
world), wage rate and the value of f, are each homogenous of degree zero
in L,LA,L B,R,K.That is, absolute size of the three countries is irrelevant
for these variables. The result follows directly from the basic structure of
the model with aggregate demand and output levels of X,Y in each country
being linear in its absolute size. Note that equilibrium output of X,Y in the
home country are linear in its absolute size due to the constant returns to
scale production functions for the two goods. This property of the solution
is similar to the one in Syropoulos (2001) and allows us to focus on relative
size of the three countries only while analyzing the time-consistent policy.
19For details, see Appendix A3.
25The second feature of the solution is that home’s ex post optimal MFN
tariﬀ, t(f(pe)), can be either increasing or decreasing in the size of its import-
competing sector captured by the value of f. I tc a nb es e e nf r o me q u a t i o n
(3) that t(f) is strictly increasing in f if and only if β − λ > 0 and it is
strictly decreasing (constant) if and only if β − λ < 0( =0 ) . The intuition
for this is simple. Keeping home’s MFN tariﬀ ﬁx e dm o m e n t a r i l y ,a ni n c r e a s e
in the size of home’s import-competing sector (value of f) reduces its equi-
librium import-volume which lowers the marginal beneﬁtt oh o m ef r o mi t s
tariﬀ since the tariﬀ now applies to a smaller import-volume base generat-
ing smaller gain in tariﬀ revenue. Thus, home’s ex post optimal tariﬀ falls
on this count. At the same time, with a higher value of f, home’s equi-
librium local price decreases which increases the consumption of good X.
Consequently, the loss in consumer surplus form the marginal tariﬀ is now
higher which again lowers the ex post optimal tariﬀ. The upward push to
the ex post optimal tariﬀ comes from a larger gain in (weighted) producer
surplus from the marginal tariﬀ due to a larger import-competing sector.
The net eﬀect of these factors on the ex post optimal tariﬀ depends on the
value of β − λ as stated above in the paragraph. We may note here that
the relationship between home’s ex post optimal tariﬀ and private agents’
expectations about the future MFN tariﬀ (te) is similarly determined. That
is, since pe(te,t e) is strictly increasing in te and f(pe) is strictly increasing in
pe, it follows that t(.) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in te if and only if
β − λ > 0 (< 0) and invariant if and only if β − λ =0 . This also establishes
qualitatively the dynamic link between home’s ex post optimal tariﬀ and the
private agents’ expectations about home’s future tariﬀ in the MFN regime.
The possibility of a negative relationship between the ex post optimal tariﬀ
and private agents’ expectations (value of te, and/or f(pe))h e r ei si ns h a r p
contrast to the ﬁndings in the literature, both theoretical and empirical. For
example, Brainard and Verdier (1997) show that for a small country with
endogenous protection, the level of tariﬀ is an increasing function of past
tariﬀs. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, Staiger and Tabellini, derive a similar
relationship between the level of protection and the size of the lobby (value
of f in our model). Further, Grossman and Helpman (1994), Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) predict a negative relationship between the optimal tariﬀ and
the import penetration ratio in sectors that are politically organized. Our
results show that these theoretical and empirical results will not hold for a
large country when β−λ < 0. We put forward this ﬁnding as a large-country
caveat to the small-country results in the literature.
26Lastly, it will be useful to deﬁne home’s market power in trade as it will
feature frequently in the analysis that follows. Using the results stated above
we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition:H o m e ’ s ex post market power in trade in the MFN regime is
equal to the improvement in its bilateral terms of trade against each foreign
country from a unit increase in its MFN tariﬀ, with its production of X,Y














As λ becomes smaller the home country becomes “smaller” in the sense that
its marker power in trade decreases. When λ approaches zero then the home
country approaches the text-book small-country case. The reverse holds
when λ approaches one. Thus, λ is our measure of home’s relative size and
also a measure of its ex post market power in trade in the MFN regime.20
This completes our description of the time-consistent equilibrium in the
MFN regime. To summarize, we derived the time-consistent equilibrium and
noted some of its important properties. The dynamic relationship between
current period (stage 2) decisions and expectations about home’s future MFN
tariﬀ was discussed.
We now proceed to the solution of the PTA regime. Since the procedure
is similar to the one above, we will omit some of the details.
20We need to distinguish between ex-post and ex-ante market power in trade. The latter
is deﬁned later in the section and shown to be diﬀerent from the former.
272.3 PTA regime solution
In this regime the home country forms a PTA with country A in stage 1
which is binding for the rest of the game. Home’s tariﬀ on country B will be
called its external tariﬀ and it is determined endogenously. For any arbitrary
value of home’s external tariﬀ, equilibrium prices and trade-volumes are given
by setting tA =0in the trading equilibrium solution outlined in section 2.1
above. A necessary condition for home’s trade policy to be “operational” is
that its equilibrium import-volume from country B is strictly positive under
complete free trade. To ensure this we impose the restriction that xB >x A.21
This assumption does not play any other role in our model. We will elaborate
on this towards the end of section 3.
T h es o l u t i o nf o rs t a g e3o ft h eg a m ew i l lb ec o m p l e t eo n c ew ed e r i v e
home’s ex post optimal external tariﬀ. This is given by the same optimization
problem as the one for the MFN regime with the modiﬁcation that we set
tA =0throughout and tB is the only choice variable. The ﬁrst order condition











The previous equation is derived and evaluated with tA =0and f held
constant. The value of tB that solves this equation is home’s ex post optimal
external tariﬀ.22
LHS of equation (4A) is the net marginal beneﬁt to the home government
from a unit increase in it’s external tariﬀ with all changes evaluated at the
margin. It is decomposed into the following terms. The ﬁrst two terms
21This assumption is necessary also for this purpose in the sense that if xB <x A then
home will import from country A only; further, if xB = xA then home imports from
country A only when its external tariﬀ is strictly positive while under complete free trade
the distribution of its import-volume across the two foreign countries is indeterminate.
Either way, for the optimal external tariﬀ to be strictly positive a necessary and suﬃcient
condition is that xB >x A.
22It can checked that the second order optimization condition is satisﬁed under the
interior solution conditions speciﬁed in Appendix A5.
28together capture the change in home’s tariﬀ revenue from the marginal tariﬀ,
the third term is the change in the weighted producer surplus in the import-
competing sector from the marginal tariﬀ and, the last term is the change
(loss) in consumer surplus from the consumption of the importable arising
from the marginal tariﬀ. These terms compare directly with the ones on
L H So fe q u a t i o n( 2 A )w h i c hw a su s e dt od e r i v eh o m e ’ sex post optimal MFN
tariﬀ.B e f o r e s o l v i n g f o r tB from equation (4A) it will be useful to state
two critical eﬀects which distinguish the PTA regime from the MFN regime.
F o l l o w i n gt h el i t e r a t u r ew ec a l lt h e s ee ﬀects the trade deﬂection eﬀect and
the market power eﬀect of PTAs and are as follows.
Trade deﬂection eﬀect
S i n c et r a d ep o l i c yi si m p l e m e n t e di nt h et h i r ds t a g eo ft h eg a m e ,w e
treat output of X,Y in each of the three countries as exogenously ﬁxed
here. Under free trade between the home country and its PTA-partner, local
p r i c e si nt h et w oc o u n t r i e sm u s tb ee q u a l .T h a ti s ,w i t htA =0we must have
p = pA. With all changes evaluated at the margin, a unit increase in home’s
external tariﬀ reduces its equilibrium import-volume from country B due to
two reasons:
(i) Firstly, it raises the local price (p) and hence consumption of the im-
portable drops by amount L∂p/∂tB. With home’s output of X,Y ﬁxed, this
implies that home’s import-volume from country B decreases by the same
amount (L∂p/∂tB)w h i c hl e a d st oal o s si ni t st a r i ﬀ revenue (and hence wel-
fare) by amount tBL∂p/∂tB. This is usual consumption distortion of the tariﬀ
and appears as part of the ﬁrst term on LHS of equation (4A).
(ii) Secondly, a unit increase in home’s external tariﬀ shifts home’s import-
volume away from country B and towards country A. The reason for this is
that with p = pA, the rise in the external tariﬀ increases equilibrium value
of pA by amount ∂pA/∂tB = ∂p/∂tB > 0 T h ee x p o r ts u p p l yf u n c t i o no f
country A has a positive slope of LA which implies that home now imports a
larger amount from its PTA-partner. Consequently, home’s import-volume
from country B decreases by amount LA∂p/∂tB. T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n th e r ei s
that this change in the composition of home’s import-volumes across the two
foreign countries reduces its tariﬀ revenue (and hence welfare) at the margin
by amount tBLA∂p/∂tB. This is captured in the ﬁrst term on LHS of equation
29(4A) and it tends to lower home’s ex post optimal external tariﬀ.F o rb r e v i t y
w ew i l lr e f e rt ot h i sa st h etrade deﬂection eﬀect o fP T A s .N o t et h a tt h i se ﬀect
is similar to the consumption distortion of the tariﬀ as discussed in (i) above
and appears symmetrically with it in equation (4A). The trade deﬂection
eﬀect is completely absent in the MFN regime (equation 2A) since, with
MFN tariﬀs, home’s total tariﬀ r e v e n u ei si n d e p e n d e n to ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o no f
its import-volume across its trading partners.23
Market power eﬀect
Continuing to treat production of X,Y as exogenously ﬁxed in the home
country, we deﬁne home’s ex post market power in trade in the PTA regime
as the improvement in its bilateral terms-of-trade against country B from a
unit increase in its external tariﬀ. From the solution in section 2.1 we get
that this equals −∂pw
B(0,t B,f)/∂tB = λ+λA. Compared to the MFN regime,
home’s ex post market power in the PTA regime is higher by an amount which
equals the size of its PTA-partner. This eﬀect is well-known in the literature
and arises because home’s import demand function for good X from country
B is more elastic in the PTA regime giving it higher market power.W en o t e
here that an immediate implication of this is that a unit increase in home’s
external tariﬀ has a much smaller impact on its equilibrium local price (equal
to λB) than a unit increase in its MFN tariﬀ (equal to λB+λA). We will refer
to both these results as the market power eﬀect of PTAs in the remainder of
the paper.
The trade deﬂection eﬀect and the market power eﬀect as identiﬁed
above will play a key role in establishing our ﬁnal result regarding the
stumbling-bloc feature of PTAs in the presence of domestic commitment
problems. We may note here that the trade deﬂection eﬀect deﬁned above
is one component of the “tariﬀ complementarity eﬀect” identiﬁed in Bag-
well and Staiger (1999b, p. 163). They note three reinforcing eﬀects that
generate complementarity across tariﬀs on imports of the same good from
diﬀerent countries. To see these eﬀects in our model, hold home’s tariﬀ on
country B ﬁxed and lower its tariﬀ on country A. Note that as a result of
this, home’s consumption of the importable will now increase which implies
a greater loss in consumer surplus from its tariﬀ on country B at the margin.
23This point is well noted in the literature. See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a.
30This is captured by the last term on LHS of equation (4A) where Cx(.) rises
as tA is lowered. This is the ﬁrst of the three eﬀects in Bagwell and Staiger.
Their second eﬀe c ti sc a p t u r e di no u rm o d e lb yal o w e rv a l u eo fEB(.) when
tA is lowered so that home’s external tariﬀ now applies to a smaller import-
volume base generating less tariﬀ revenue. Their third eﬀect is captured by
our trade deﬂection eﬀect. 24
Continuing with the stage 3 solution in the PTA regime, the implicit








The equation is evaluated at tA =0 ,ftreated as ﬁxed and, derived after
substituting Cx(.) − F = EA + EB.
Comparing equation (5) and (4A) it is easy to check that the term λA/λ
in the denominator of RHS in equation (5) is due to the trade deﬂection
eﬀect of PTAs as discussed above. The diﬀerence in the ex post incentive
structure of the home government in the MFN and PTA regimes can be seen
by comparing equation (2A) with equation (5). We note the following diﬀer-
ences between the two. (i) Firstly, the trade deﬂection eﬀect is completely
a b s e n ti ne q u a t i o n( 2 A )u n l i k ei ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) . T h ed e n o m i n a t o ri nR H S
of equation (2A) is simply 1 which captures the consumption distortion of
the MFN tariﬀ while the denominator in equation (5) reﬂects the sum of
the consumption distortion of the tariﬀ and the trade deﬂection eﬀect.25 (ii)
Secondly, the market power eﬀect is reﬂected in the diﬀerence between the
coeﬃcients of M/L and EB/L in equations (2A) and (5), respectively. That
is, in the MFN regime home’s ex post optimal tariﬀ depends on the ratio of
its market power relative to that of the rest of the world which is captured
24For more details on this, see pages 162-163, Bagwell and Staiger, 1999b.
25Note that in equation (5) the denominator terms, 1+λA/λ, capture the consumption
distortion and the trade deﬂection eﬀect per unit increase in home’s local price from the
marginal external tariﬀ (that is, after dividing by ∂p/∂tB), per agent in the home country




term in equation (2A). In the PTA regime, home’s ex post market
power equals λ + λA and that of country B equals λB. The impact of this
change is reﬂected in the numerator term of the coeﬃcient of EB/L in equa-
tion (5). (iii) The third diﬀerence is captured by the EA/L term in equation
(5) which is absent in equation (2A). Intuitively, in the PTA regime, a unit
increase in home’s external tariﬀ shifts home’s demand for the importable
towards its PTA-partner and worsens its bilateral terms-of-trade vis-a-vis the
same country. Evaluated at the margin, this implies that the home country
now pays more for its imports from country A which (per home-agent) equals
EA/L. This tends to lower home’s ex post optimal external tariﬀ. This ef-
fect is completely absent in the MFN regime due to the very deﬁnition of
non-discriminatory tariﬀs.
Substituting for EA,E B in equation (5) and solving for tB we get the
explicit solution as:
tB = tB(f) ≡ ∆1 +
λ
λ + λA + λAλB +( 1− λB)2(β − λ)f .....(6)
∆1 ≡
xB − (1 + λ)(λBxB + λAxA)
λ + λA + λAλB +( 1− λB)2 > 0
The previous inequality follows from the interior solution conditions speciﬁed
in Appendix A5.
Using the value of tB as given by equation (6), setting tA =0and
using the trading equilibrium solution in section 2.1 we can derive equilibrium
values of all the stage-3 endogenous variables for any arbitrarily given value
of f.
The solution for stage 2 of the game (factor market equilibrium) and the
time-consistent external tariﬀ can be easily derived by following exactly the
32same steps as outlined earlier for the MFN regime. That is, factor market
equilibrium, for any given value of pe, is exactly the same as stated earlier. For
the time-consistent external tariﬀ,l e tt∗
pta ≡ home’s time-consistent external
tariﬀ.S e tte
A = tA =0 .W eh a v et h a tt∗
pta is given by the following ﬁxed-point
condition:
t∗
pta = tB(f(pe(0,t ∗
pta)))
The solution value of t∗
pta is well deﬁned, unique, stable and strictly interior.
For details, see Appendix B1.
Using the value of t∗
pta derived above, pe(.) function and the trading equi-
librium solution of section 2.1, we can fully determine the time-consistent
equilibrium values of all the remaining endogenous variables in the PTA
regime. We may note here that the market power eﬀect and the trade deﬂec-
tion eﬀect are captured by the tB(.) function and hence are critical in deter-
mining the value of t∗
pta. This completes our discussion of the time-consistent
equilibrium in the MFN and PTA regimes.
We now proceed to the next section where we derive the full commit-
ment optimal tariﬀ in the MFN and PTA regimes, discuss the sources of the
commitment problem and establish our ﬁnal results.
S e c t i o n3 :P T A sa ss t u m b l i n gb l o c s
The structure of section 3 is as follows. In section 3.1 we derive the full
commitment optimal MFN tariﬀ of the home country. Using the results, we
state the sources of the commitment problem. In section 3.2 we do the same
for the PTA regime. Section 3.3 is our ﬁnal section where we show how PTAs
can be stumbling blocs due to domestic commitment problem.
333.1 Full commitment optimal tariﬀ in the MFN regime
For brevity, we will refer to the full commitment optimal tariﬀ as sim-
ply the “optimal” tariﬀ. In the MFN regime, this is deﬁned as the fully
anticipated tariﬀ that is announced before private agents make their stage-2
decisions and is fully binding in the future. The solution stated in section 2
can be easily used here by noting the following sequence of moves. Suppose
that the home government announces a tariﬀ vector (tA,t B). Since this is
fully binding in the future, we set te
J = tJ for J =A,B. Under rational expec-
tations, private agents must predict the future equilibrium local price in the
home market to be q = q(tA,t B) ≡ pe(tA,t B). As in section 2, the value of q
is implicitly given by the following condition:
q = α − (λf(q)+λAxA + λBxB)+λAtA + λBtB
Factor market equilibrium conditions are exactly the same as in the
previous section. That is, aggregate domestic production of good X equals
Lf(q), equilibrium wage rate equals w(q) and the allocation of labor in sectors
X, Y equals Lx(q) and Ly(q), respectively. Equilibrium world prices, trading
volumes and welfare levels in the three countries can be derived from these
values and the trading equilibrium solution of section 2.1. Thus, our solution
will be complete once we determine the optimal values of tA,t B.
The optimal MFN tariﬀ is given by the following optimization problem:
Maximize qLf(q)+G(Ly(q))+tM(t,t,f(q))+Ls(q)+β(qLf(q)−w(q)Lx(q))
by choosing t, with q = q(t,t),t≥ 0.
The ﬁrst three terms in the maximization problem together equal home’s
national income, the fourth term is home’s total consumer surplus from the
consumption of the non-numeraire good and, the last term is equal to the
welfare of the lobby (producer surplus in sector X) weighted by the political
parameter, β.






















dpe ; all variables are evaluated at
p = pe = q(t,t) and tJ = te
J = t for J =A,B. For interior solution restrictions
and the second order maximization condition, see Appendix (A4).
LHS of equation (7) can be interpreted as follows. The ﬁrst three terms
together capture the change in home government’s welfare from a unit in-
crease in its MFN tariﬀ and evaluated at the original wage rate and output
levels of X,Y. This is the usual sum of changes in home’s tariﬀ revenue, con-
sumer surplus and weighted producer surplus from the marginal MFN tariﬀ,
evaluated at the original output level of the two goods. It the same as LHS
of equation (2A) except that the impact on home’s equilibrium price is diﬀer-








while in equation (2A) we have
P
J=A,B
∂p(t,t,f)/∂tJ =1 −λ. Note that the for-
mer term is strictly less than the latter term. The intuition for this diﬀerence
is that when future policy is fully anticipated then production is endogenous
to the policy announcement and a higher anticipated tariﬀ increases domes-
tic production of the importable. This implies a smaller increase in home’s
equilibrium local price than when production is ﬁxed (as in equation (2A)).
T h el a s tt e r mo nL H Si ne q u a t i o n( 7 )c a p t u r e st h ewage distortion and the
production distortion of a fully anticipated increase in home’s MFN tariﬀ.
These two distortions constitute the two sources of commitment problem in
our model and will be discussed shortly after stating the solution for the
optimal MFN tariﬀ from equation (7).
Let ˆ tmfn ≡ value of t that solves equation (7). We have:
35ˆ tmfn =
β(f + r2)
1+f0 +[ λ/(1 − λ)]M(.)/L .....(7A)
with RHS of the equation evaluated at the optimal MFN tariﬀ, ˆ tmfn; and
p = pe = q(.).
Sources of commitment problem
These can be seen by comparing the expressions for ˆ tmfn and the time-
consistent MFN tariﬀ, t∗
mfn. Noting that t∗
mfn must be ex post optimal, it
must satisfy equation (2B) which we restate here for convenience: t∗
mfn =
βf +[ λ/(1 − λ)]M(.)/L, with all variables evaluated at t∗
mfn and p = pe =
q(.). The last two equalities here follow from the fact that, in equilibrium,
expectations must be realized and they must be internally consistent in the
rational expectations sense. Comparing ˆ tmfn and t∗
mfn we can see that if the
home government maximizes pure national welfare (β =0 )t h e nˆ tmfn = t∗
mfn.
That is, under the MFN restriction, short-run production and wage rigidities
do not lead to commitment problems when the government maximizes pure
national welfare. The intuition for this is simple. Home’s full commitment
pure national welfare maximizing MFN tariﬀ is equal to the reciprocal of the
weighted average of the export-supply elasticities of its trading partners, with
the weights being the shares of the trading partners in home’s total import-
volume.26 Evaluated at ˆ tmfn (with β =0 ), ex post, these elasticities and
weights are completely unaﬀected by the production and wage rigidities in the
home country. Consequently, there is no incentive for the home government
to surprise private agents and the optimal policy is time-consistent. We
may note here that this result does not depend on the linear structure of
the model but is a general result.27 It will be useful to see this result from
equation (7) and (2A) which capture, respectively, the ex ante and ex post
26That is, for any value of home’s MFN tariﬀ t, te
J = t for J =A,B and p = pe =
q(.), we have: [λ/(1 − λ)]M/L = pw(eAEA/M + eBEB/M)−1, where pw ≡ pw
A = pw
B,
eJ ≡ (∂EJ/∂pJ)(pJ/EJ) for J =A,B is the elasticity of foreign country J’s export-supply
function. From this it follows that the optimal MFN tariﬀ can be expressed as: ˆ tmfn/pw =
(eAEA/M +eBEB/M)−1 where ˆ tmfn/pw is the optimal tariﬀ expressed as an ad-valorem
rate and all variables are evaluated at ˆ tmfn and p = pe = q(.). RHS of the expression for
ˆ tmfn/pw is the reciprocal of the weighted average of export-supply elasticities of home’s
trading partners as stated above. Note that none of the variables in ˆ tmfn/pw equation are
aﬀected by production and wage rigidities in the home country.
27See the previous footnote.
36incentive structures in the MFN regime. Set β =0in both these equations.
For ˆ tmfn = t∗
mfn to hold it must be that LHS of equations (7) and (2A) are
equal at ˆ tmfn. Since, ex ante, production is endogenous, a higher anticipated
tariﬀ leads to the usual production distortion w h i c hi sc a p t u r e db yt h ef0
term in equation (7). This distortion is completely absent from equation
(2A) since, ex post,p r o d u c t i o ni sﬁxed. It follows from this that the LHS
of equation (2A) will be higher than that of equation (7). However, this
tendency is countered by the fact that, ex post, home’s market power in trade,






1+λf0 .28 Ex post,al o w e rmarket power creates
i n c e n t i v ef o rt h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tt olower its tariﬀ below the optimal tariﬀ.
These two eﬀects are equal and opposite in sign and, together, eliminate any
incentive for surprise protection. Thus, commitment problem is completely
eliminated.
With the above explanation in place we now focus on the case when
β > 0 and, without loss of generality, on the “politically optimal” tariﬀ
which is completely captured and deﬁned by the ﬁrst term on RHS of equa-
tion (7A) when policy is fully anticipated and by the ﬁrst term on RHS of
equation (2A) when it is unanticipated (the ex post case).29 Noting that the
time-consistent MFN tariﬀmust satisfy equation (2A), it is straightforward to
check by comparing equations (7A) and (2A) that ˆ tmfn is not time-consistent.
The time inconsistency of the optimal MFN tariﬀ is fully captured by r2 and
f0 in equation (7A) which are absent (equal to zero) in equation (2A). These
terms can be interpreted as follows. A fully anticipated increase in home’s
future MFN tariﬀ implies that private agents predict (and rationally so) a
higher equilibrium price in home’s local market (value of pe). This implies
a higher domestic production of good X (since f0 > 0) and, consequently,
l o w e ri m p o r t - v o l u m ef o rh o m e . T h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt from a unit increase
28Home’s ex ante market power in the MFN regime is deﬁned as the improvement in
its bilateral terms-of-trade against each foreign country due to a unit increase in its MFN
tariﬀ when production in the home country is endogenous to the increase in the tariﬀ rate.
Note that under the MFN restriction there is no diﬀerence between home’s bilateral and
multilateral terms-of-trade.
29Politically optimal tariﬀ is the tariﬀ that the home government ﬁnds optimal to imple-
ment if it were, hypothetically speaking, to neglect the terms-of-trade beneﬁts. For more
details, see Bagwell and Stagier, 1999a.
37in home’s MFN tariﬀ is hence lower because the lower import-volume gen-
erates smaller gain in tariﬀ revenue. Ex ante, the home government takes
this cost into account which is the usual production distortion of the tariﬀ
and consequently its (full commitment) optimal tariﬀ is lower on this count.
Ex post, production is ﬁxed and thus this cost is completely absent. With a
lower marginal cost of its tariﬀ, ex post, the government has an incentive to
surprise private agents with a higher tariﬀ. This constitutes one source of the
commitment problem in our model. The second source of the commitment
problem arises due to the short-run wage rigidity. That is, when future policy
is fully anticipated, a small increase in home’s future tariﬀ implies that ﬁrms
in home’s import-competing sector like to produce more and hence demand
more labor. As a result, more labor is employed in sector X and the equi-
librium wage rate increases. The impact of these two changes on the total
surplus of the lobby equals r2L =[ q(.)dF(.)/dLx − w]dLx/dpe − Lxdw/dpe.
Note that since ﬁrms are perfectly competitive in the labor market, it follows
that pedF/dLx = w (factor market equilibrium condition as stated in section
2) and, q(.)=pe when future policy is fully anticipated. Substituting these
equations in the expression for r2L we get: r2L = −Lxdw/dpe < 0. That is,
when future policy is fully anticipated then the ﬁrst term in the expression
for r2L is equal to zero. The intuition for this is simple. For any given wage
rate, ﬁrms hire labor optimally. Consequently, Lx is always at its optimal
level with respect to the surplus of the lobby. Thus, any inﬁnitesimal revision
in the value of Lx generates a second order eﬀect only on the lobby’s welfare.
T h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n t ’ s( f u l lc o m m i t m e n t )o p t i m a lt a r i ﬀ is completely unaf-
fected by the impact of the change in Lx on the lobby’s welfare arising from
a higher anticipated future tariﬀ. This holds ex post also. That is, ex post,
Lx is ﬁxed and thus the ex post optimal tariﬀ is independent of the impact
o ft h ec h a n g ei nLx on the lobby’s welfare. We are now left with −Lxdw/dpe
term only in the expression for r2. Ex ante, this is strictly negative because,
unlike Lx, perfect competition in the labor market implies that w is not set
optimally (non-monopsonistic wage) from the lobby’s point of view. A small
increase in the wage rate due to an inﬁnitesimally small increase in antici-
pated future tariﬀ produces a ﬁrst order welfare loss to the lobby and thus
lowers the government’s marginal political beneﬁt from protection. This is
simply what we earlier referred to as the “dissipation of rents” away from the
intended beneﬁciaries (the lobby) and towards the unintended beneﬁciaries
(the laborers). The (ex ante)o p t i m a lt a r i ﬀ t a k e st h i sc o s ti n t oa c c o u n tb u t ,
ex post, this cost is absent due to wage rigidity. This diﬀerence in the incen-
38tive structure, ex ante and ex post, creates incentive for surprise protection
and the commitment problem follows from this. From the structure of the
argument above, it can be easily seen that if the lobby were a monopsonistic
buyer in the labor market then, for any value of te,p e,i tw i l lh i r el a b o rt o
the point such that Lx,wwill be jointly optimal with respect to its total sur-
plus. The ﬁrst order condition for this is simply that r2L =0 . Consequently,
short-run wage rigidity will cease to be a source of commitment problem for
the home government. That is, a fully anticipated (inﬁnitesimally) small
increase in home’s future MFN tariﬀ will increase the equilibrium value of
Lx,w but these changes will have second order eﬀects only on the lobby’s
welfare since Lx,ware set optimally to begin with. Home’s optimal tariﬀ will
then be independent of these changes. Ex post, the incentive structure holds
due to the short-run labor immobility and the wage rigidity. We summarize
our discussion on the wage distortion as a source of commitment problem as
follows. A fully anticipated increase in home’s future tariﬀ leads to greater
demand for labor and a higher equilibrium wage rate. When the lobby is
non-monopsonistic in the factor market then these changes shift some of the
beneﬁt of higher protection away from the lobby and towards labor. This
has a ﬁrst order eﬀect on the lobby’s surplus and the government’s over-
all welfare which tends to push the optimal tariﬀ downwards. However, ex
post,t h i se ﬀect is completely absent due to the short-run rigidities mentioned
above. Consequently, ex post, the government ﬁnds it optimal to revise its
tariﬀ upwards rendering the optimal tariﬀ time-inconsistent.30
30We may note here that the wage distortion in the sense described above as a source
of commitment problem can exist even if the production distortion is completely absent.
T h i sc a nb es e e nb ys e t t i n gdLx/dpe =0throughout the model and noting that r2 is
still strictly negative. For example, if labor is completely immobile across sectors ex-
ante and ex-post then production distortion will be completely absent. However, if a
higher tariﬀ is anticipated in the future, then domestic ﬁrms in sector X will compete
for scarce labor within the sector. Although the aggregate labor employed in the sector
will be unchanged, however, equilibrium wage will rise. That is, wage distortion of a
fully anticipated increase in future protection will still exist. The argument establishes
that commitment problem can arise due to wage distortion alone even when production
distortion is completely absent. This result is in sharp contrast to the literature where
short-run rigidity in intersectoral movement of labor, as opposed to its long-run perfect
(costless) mobility, is the only reason which renders optimal policy time inconsistent. See,
for example, Stagier and Tabellini, Maggi and Rodriguez-Claire. An exception to this is
Mitra (2002). However, his focus is on ﬁxed (and sunk) cost of lobbying which is completely
diﬀerent from the wage distortion as the source of commitment problem in this paper. We
discuss this issue more in the conclusion of the paper.
39From the arguments stated above we get the following Proposition.
Proposition 1:I nt h eM F Nr e g i m ew i t hβ > 0, the time-consistent tariﬀ is
strictly higher than the full commitment optimal tariﬀ.
Proof: See Appendix B2.
The proof of the previous Proposition follows directly from the fact that, ex
post, the home government has an incentive to surprise private agents with a
tariﬀ which is strictly higher than the pre-announced (optimal) one and, the
time-consistent MFN tariﬀ is stable and unique.
We now proceed to derive the optimal tariﬀ in the PTA regime. Since
the procedure is similar to the one for the MFN regime we will omit some of
the details.
3.2 Full commitment optimal tariﬀ in the PTA regime
Home’s optimal external tariﬀ is given by the following optimization
problem:
Maximize qLf(q)+G(Ly(q)) + tBEB(tA,t B,f(q)) + Ls(q)+β(qLf(q) −
w(q)Lx(q))
by choosing tB, with q = q(tA,t B),t A =0 ,t B ≥ 0.
This is the same as the one for the MFN regime with the additional restriction
that tA =0 .














Let ˆ tpta ≡ solution value of tB that is obtained from the previous equation.31
We have:
31For interior solution conditions for ˆ tpta and the second order optimization condition,
see Appendix A4.
40ˆ tpta =






All variables on RHS of equation (8) are evaluated with tB = ˆ tpta,t A =0 ,
p = pe = q(0,ˆ tpta).
Interpretation of equation (8) is similar to that of equation (7A) except
that we now have the market power eﬀect and the trade deﬂection eﬀect of
PTAs as deﬁned earlier. The commitment problem in the PTA regime can
be noted by comparing equation (8) with equation (5). Note that the two
equations diﬀer due to the production distortion (f0 in equation (8)) and the
wage distortion (r2 in equation (8)). The sources of the commitment problem
are thus the same as in the MFN regime. It is important to note that, home’s
optimal external tariﬀ, ˆ tpta, depends critically on the trade deﬂection eﬀect
and the market power eﬀect. T h ef o r m e ri sc a p t u r e db yt h eλA/λ term in
the denominator of RHS of equation (8), while the latter is captured in the
diﬀerence between the numerator of the coeﬃcient of EB/L in equation (8)
and coeﬃcient of M/L in equation (7A or/and 2B). This was discussed in
detail in section 2 and we omit elaborating on it here. We will discuss some
important properties of equation (8) when we establish our ﬁnal results in
the next-subsection.
3.3 PTAs as stumbling blocs
We introduce the following notations to study the stumbling-bloc feature
of PTAs:
ΩFC
j ≡ overall welfare of the home government when it can commit itself, ex
ante, to the optimal tariﬀ in regime j = MFN, PTA.
ΩTC
j ≡ overall welfare of the government in the time-consistent equilibrium
in regime j = MFN, PTA.
ΩFTA ≡ overall welfare of the government in the FTA regime.
Values of all these welfare levels can be easily computed by using the solution
stated above.
Lastly, commitment ineﬃciency, deﬁned as the loss in home government’s
overall welfare due to its inability to credibly commit itself, ex ante,t ot h e
future trade policy, is given by:
41ηmfn ≡ ΩFC
MFN − ΩTC
MFN ≥ 0 in the MFN regime and,
ηpta ≡ ΩFC
PTA− ΩTC
PTA ≥ 0 in the PTA regime.
Deﬁnition: PTAs are stumbling blocs for wider multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion if and only if:
ΩFC
PTA− ηpta > ΩFTA > ΩFC
MFN − ηmfn ......(9)
The second inequality in (9) ensures that the government prefers to liberal-
ize multilaterally if the PTA-option is not available. Note that a necessary
condition for this to hold is that ηmfn > 0 since ΩFC
MFN > ΩFTA. That is,
absent-commitment problem, home’s optimal MFN tariﬀ, ˆ tmfn, is strictly
positive which implies the previous inequality. Clearly, while this feature is
based on our assumption that foreign tariﬀs are zero, however, it allows us
to focus on multilateral trade liberalization driven by domestic commitment
problem only. In the Introduction of the paper we had referred to this as the
“potential trade liberalizing eﬀect of domestic commitment problems”. The
ﬁrst inequality in (9) ensures that if the PTA-option is available then the
government will prefer it over multilateral trade liberalization. The two in-
equalities together put forward a positive theory of why countries may seek
regional agreements and, further, why such agreements may be stumbling
blocs for multilateral trade liberalization.32
Condition (9) allows us to relate our paper with the stumbling-building
blocs literature. That is, the ﬁndings in the literature explain how condition
(9) holds with ηmfn = ηpta =0 . The present paper contributes to this
literature by highlighting the role of domestic commitment problems (ηmfn
and ηpta terms in (9)) in explaining the stumbling-bloc feature of PTAs.
32It will not make any diﬀerence to our results if either one or both the inequalities in
(9) were replaced by weak inequalities.
42The aim of the remaining section is to derive conditions (parameter
restrictions) for which condition (9) holds and to relate them to domestic
commitment problem, trade deﬂection eﬀect and the market power eﬀect of
PTAs. To this end we state the following Proposition.
Proposition 2:
(i) PTAs are stumbling blocs only if the home government faces commitment
problem vis-a-vis its domestic private agents. That is, only if ηmfn > 0.
(ii) There exists a critical values of λ,b 1, denoted by λ
∗,b ∗
1 ∈ (0,1), such that
∀λ ≤ λ
∗ and ∀b1 ≥ b∗
1, t h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tp r e f e r sa nex ante commitment
to multilateral free trade (FTA regime) over no commitment (MFN regime).
That is, the second inequality in (9) holds.
Proof: See Appendix B3.
Part (i) of the Proposition has already been discussed above. The in-
tuition for part (ii) is simple. When λ is suﬃciently small (λ ≤ λ
∗)t h e n
the terms-of-trade related beneﬁt to home from an active trade policy in
the MFN regime is relatively small and it approaches zero as λ approaches
zero. Similarly, when b1 is suﬃciently large (b1 ≥ b∗
1) then the marginal
productivity of labor schedule in sector X is relatively ﬂat. Consequently,
the wage distortion of an anticipated increase in future tariﬀ is suﬃciently
large. Beneﬁt from higher protection is mostly dissipated away from the
lobby and towards labor. With the terms-of-trade related beneﬁts and the
political beneﬁts being suﬃciently small, home’s optimal MFN tariﬀ is close
to zero. However, the time-consistent tariﬀ is strictly positive (for political
reason) since, ex post, wage distortion is completely absent. The production
distortion associated with the time-consistent equilibrium is strictly bounded
away from zero implying that an ex ante commitment to multilateral free
trade strictly dominates no commitment at all. This result is similar to the
one in Staiger and Tabellini although for diﬀerent reasons. That is, Staiger
and Tabellini show that fully anticipated increase in future tariﬀ has no ef-
fect on the distribution of income while the production distortion (in the
time-consistent equilibrium) is strictly positive. Since they focus on a small
country, the terms-of-trade beneﬁts from protection do not arise.
43In order to analyze the nature of the commitment problem in the PTA
regime we state the following Proposition.
Proposition 3
If home’s PTA-partner is suﬃciently large relative to home, then the trade
deﬂection eﬀect ensures that commitment ineﬃciency in the PTA regime is
arbitrarily small. That is, there exists a critical value of LA/L = λA/λ such
that for all λA/λ greater than this critical value, ηpta ≈ 0.
Proof: Home’s time-consistent external tariﬀ, t∗
pta, must be ex post optimal
which implies that it must satisfy equation (5). The optimal external tariﬀ,
however, is given by equation (8). Comparing the two equations we note
that as λA/λ →∞then RHS of the two equations converge to the same
common value. In the proof of Proposition 2 we have already shown that pe
is bounded below and this lower bound is strictly positive. Further, it can
be checked from the trading equilibrium solution in section 2.1 that EA/L
and EB/L are bounded above and below. Consequently, as λA/λ →∞ ,t h e
ﬁrst term on RHS of equation (8) and the same of equation (5) converge
to zero. This implies that the diﬀerence between t∗
pta and ˆ tpta converges to
zero.33 Note that all our functions are continuous. This implies that as
the diﬀerence between t∗
pta and ˆ tpta converges to zero, ΩFC
PTA− ΩTC
PTA ≡ ηpta
converges to zero. By the deﬁnition of limits, the result implies that there
exists a critical value of λA/λ such that the statement in the Proposition
holds. Note that this result is derived completely from the fact that the
trade deﬂection eﬀect,c a p t u r e db yλA/λ in the denominator of the ﬁrst term
on RHS of equations (5) and (8), becomes arbitrarily large which drives these
two terms to zero. Thus, trade deﬂection eﬀect alone is suﬃcient to ensure
that home’s commitment ineﬃciency in the PTA regime is arbitrarily small
if its PTA-partner is suﬃciently large relative to itself. Market power eﬀect
is completely irrelevant here.
Q.E.D.
Comparing the previous two Propositions we note that while Proposi-
tion 2 highlights conditions under which home would prefer a multilateral
free trade agreement over no commitment, Proposition 3 states that if home
were to instead form a PTA then, under the conditions speciﬁed, its commit-
ment problem will be virtually eliminated. Note that the conditions identi-
33The limiting values of t∗
pta and ˆ tpta are well deﬁned under appropriate (interior soulu-
tion) conditions. See the proof of Proposition 4,5 for more details.
44ﬁed in the two Propositions are consistent with each other. That is, both
these Propositions hold when b1 is suﬃciently large and λA/λ is suﬃciently
large.34 The next Proposition ties our arguments together to establish con-
ditions under which domestic commitment problems imply that PTAs will
be stumbling blocs.
Proposition 4
Domestic commitment problems imply that PTAs will be stumbling blocs
when b1 is suﬃciently large and home can form a PTA with a country which
is suﬃciently large relative to the rest of the world (high value of λA).T h e
trade deﬂection eﬀect and the market power eﬀect work in tandem with one
another in producing this result.
Proof: The Proposition does not impose any restrictions on the value of
L/LB w h i c hi sh o m e ’ ss i z er e l a t i v et ot h a to fc o u n t r yB( n o n - m e m b e rc o u n -
try). Hence we treat this as a parameter in the proof that follows. The
proof utilizes limit-analysis. As home’s PTA-partner (country A) becomes
arbitrarily large relative to the rest of the world, it follows by deﬁnition that
λA → 1, λ → 0 and λB → 0. Thus, λA/λ →∞ . Let b1 ≥ b∗
1 which is de-
ﬁned in Proposition 2. These features ensure that the conditions identiﬁed
in Propositions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed. Consequently, commitment ineﬃciency
in the MFN regime is suﬃciently large so that home would prefer the FTA
regime over the MFN regime (Proposition 2). That is, the second inequality
in (9) holds. All we need to show is that the ﬁrst inequality in (9) holds too
at the same time and relate this feature to the trade deﬂection eﬀect and the
market power eﬀect. To this end note that since conditions in Proposition
3a r es a t i s ﬁed here, it follows that as λA → 1, ηpta → 0, and t∗
pta → ˆ tpta.
Now consider equation (5) which must be satisﬁed by t∗
pta.As λA → 1 so that
λA/λ →∞ , it follows that the ﬁrst term on RHS of equation (5) converges
to zero due to the trade deﬂection eﬀect as explained in Proposition 3. The




that λA/λ in the denominator of this term is the trade deﬂection eﬀect as
discussed earlier. This eﬀect drives the value of this expression (and hence
t∗
pta) to zero as λA → 1 (or λA/λ →∞ ). This tendency is countered by
the fact that the numerator term, (λ+λB)/λB =[ 1+( λA/λ)]λ/λB tends to
34From the deﬁnition of λ,λA it follows that as λA/λ becomes arbitrarily large then λ
becomes arbitrarily small.
45inﬁnity as λA → 1. This is simply due to the market power eﬀect of PTAs.
P T Aw i t hc o u n t r yAi n c r e a s e sh o m e ’ smarket power in trade against coun-
try B which increases its optimal external tariﬀ for terms-of-trade related
beneﬁts against country B. The net eﬀect of these two opposite forces is
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> 0. Putting these arguments together we get that the
market power eﬀect and the trade deﬂection eﬀect working in tandem ensure
that: limit t∗
pta = limit ˆ tB =
xB − xA
2
> 0. The previous inequality follows
form our interior solution condition that home’s import-volume from country
B is strictly positive (in the limit) in the PTA regime. Note that (xB−xA)/2
is home’s “revenue-maximizing tariﬀ” in the PTA regime. Home’s tariﬀ rev-
enue per home-agent in the limit equals [(xB − xA)2/4]LB/L > 0. The rest
of the proof is straightforward. Since t∗
pta and ˆ tB converge to the same value
which is strictly positive, it follows that in the limit ΩFC
PTA = ΩTC
PTA > ΩFTA
which ensures that the ﬁrst inequality in (9) holds. From the deﬁnition of
limits, it follows that there exists a suﬃciently high critical value of λA such
that the statement in the Proposition holds for all values of λA greater than
this critical value (given that b1 ≥ b∗
1).
Q.E.D.
We summarize the ﬁndings in the previous three Propositions in the
following way. Domestic commitment problems reduce the beneﬁtf r o ma n
active trade policy. The paper highlights the role of production and wage
distortions in this context. When commitment related ineﬃciencies are suf-
ﬁciently severe then the government prefers to bind its trade policy through
an ex ante commitment to a multilateral free trade agreement (Proposition
2). This is the trade liberalizing eﬀect of domestic commitment problems.
The result is similar to the one in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare although they
do not focus on trade liberalization. With this holding, we seek to explore
if the PTA-option will undermine this trade liberalizing eﬀect or enhance it
from the multilateral point of view. Propositions 3 and 4 address this issue.
Speciﬁcally, if the home country forms a PTA with a suﬃciently large coun-
try (relative to itself) then the domestic commitment problem is virtually
eliminated (Proposition 3). The trade deﬂection eﬀect increases home’s cost
46of any ex post revision in its external tariﬀ so that incentive for surprise
protection is eliminated. The time-consistent tariﬀ approaches the full com-
mitment optimal tariﬀ. The stumbling bloc feature of PTAs is established
by next showing that home’s optimal external tariﬀ is strictly bounded away
from zero. Proposition 4 establishes this. Brieﬂy, the trade deﬂection eﬀect
enhances home’s cost of protection against country B which, by itself, drives
its optimal external tariﬀ to zero when its PTA-partner is suﬃciently large
relative to itself. While this eﬀect alone renders the stumbling bloc feature of
PTAs insigniﬁcant, however, the market power eﬀect counters this by push-
ing the optimal external tariﬀ upwards. The net eﬀect of these two forces is
that home’s optimal external tariﬀ is strictly bounded away from zero and,
depending on the parameter values, can be signiﬁcant. Thus, the trade de-
ﬂection eﬀect and the market power eﬀect work in tandem with one another
rendering PTAs stumbling blocs in the presence of domestic commitment
problems.
The requirement in Proposition 4 that home’s PTA-partner is suﬃciently
large can be immediately diluted in the following way. Suppose that the world
consists of a large number of countries with each one being relatively small
i n d i v i d u a l l y .D e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ei sn os i n g l el a r g ec o u n t r y ,t h eb a s i c
results of this paper will continue to hold since home can now form a PTA
with a relatively large proportion of foreign countries. The market power
eﬀect and the trade deﬂection eﬀect identiﬁed in the paper will continue to
h a v et h es a m ee ﬀect in this alternative world-structure. Thus, the value of
λA in our model can be alternatively interpreted as the size of home’s trading
bloc.
Before closing section 3 we would like to mention that, in addition to
showing how PTAs could be stumbling blocs due to commitment related
problems, the paper serves to highlight a broader theme in that it shows
that the beneﬁt from international trading rules (e.g., Article XXIV of WTO)
may depend critically on the nature of domestic institutions within individual
countries. Analyzing the link between the structure of domestic and inter-
national policy-making institutions is likely to enrich our understanding of
policy related issues.
47Conclusion
Domestic commitment problems create incentive for a country to seek
multilateral free trade agreements to bind its trade policy. Such agreements
will be preferred over an active trade policy when the latter involves large
commitment ineﬃciencies relative to the terms-of-trade related and political
gains in the time-consistent equilibrium. However, if a bilateral agreement is
formed then commitment ineﬃciencies are virtually eliminated and, at the
same time, the agreement allows the home country to exploit the terms-of-
trade related gains against the non-member countries. Consequently, incen-
tive for further (multilateral) trade liberalization is eliminated. The paper
identiﬁes conditions when this will happen. We put forward this as another
reason why regional agreements are stumbling blocs for wider multilateral
trade liberalization. In the conclusion we consider some generalizations of
our model and suggest further extensions.
Firstly, to keep the model simple and focus on the domestic commit-
ment problem, we assumed that the tariﬀs of the two foreign countries were
(exogenously) ﬁxed at zero. Clearly, richer models can be explored here by
considering the Nash equilibrium in tariﬀ games. We believe that the basic
results of our model will still hold. That is, the home country can again form
aP T Aw i t has u ﬃciently large number of countries so that the market power
eﬀect and the trade deﬂection eﬀect will again be the dominant eﬀects. We
m a yn o t eh e r et h a tt h e s ee ﬀects are quite independent of whether a non-
member country retaliates or adopts a free trade policy against the home
country. However, a related issue here is that the strategic interaction across
countries and between the domestic country and its private agents, are likely
to be interdependent and exploring these can provide a better understanding
of the relationship between domestic and international institutions. Further,
t h em a g n i t u d eo ft h ed o m e s t i cc o m m i t m e n tp r o b l e mi nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,
when the home country (or the trading block to which it belongs) is not
too large, depends crucially on the trade policies of the foreign countries.
Consequently, externalities can travel across countries through each coun-
try’s local prices. This can provide another rationale for coordinating trade
policies across countries. Prescribing rules for international institutions like
t h eW T Ot oi n t e r n a l i z et h i se x t e r n a l i t yw o u l db ea ni m p o r t a n ti s s u eh e r e .
48Secondly, the model highlights two diﬀerent sources of time inconsis-
tency problem. The non-monopsonistic nature of the lobby was one of them.
Clearly, this source can be further explored. For instance, it is easy to see
that if the lobby had the option to collude (in the factor market) then its
optimal collusion will never be perfectly monopsonistic. An inﬁnitesimally
small move away from perfect collusion will produce only second order loss to
t h el o b b y( t h r o u g hc h a n g e si nt h ew a g er a t ea n dt h ea m o u n to fl a b o rh i r e d ) ,
but it will produce ﬁrst order gains (for the lobby) through its impact on
ex post optimal tariﬀ. This opens up the possibility of strategic interaction
b e t w e e nt h el o b b ya n dt h eg o v e r n m e n ta n dt h ei m p a c to ft h i so nt r a d ep o l i c y
and welfare can be signiﬁcant.
Thirdly, we focused on the trade deﬂection and the market power ef-
fects of PTAs. Clearly, other aspects of regional agreement can be explored
too. For example, we may explore whether a country seeking to enhance its
credibility would choose trade creating or diverting PTAs. These two are
likely to have diﬀerent commitment-enhancing beneﬁts for the home coun-
t r ya st h e yo ﬀer diﬀerent incentive to for ex post surprise protection. The
issue can be explored if full detail. Another interesting eﬀect which can re-
inforce the ﬁndings of the paper is the “tariﬀ-complementarity eﬀect”. That
is, once a bilateral agreement is formed the home country will ﬁnd it optimal
to lower its tariﬀ on its imports from the non-member country for reasons
other than the trade deﬂection cost. As Bagwell and Staiger (1999b) note,
f r e et r a d eb e t w e e nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ya n di t sP T A - p a r t n e ri m p l i e st h a t ,w i t h
home’s external tariﬀ held ﬁxed momentarily, home’s import-volume from
the non-member country will fall which reduces home’s (terms-of-trade re-
lated) marginal beneﬁt from protection. This implies that, ex post, home will
have a smaller incentive to revise its tariﬀ upwards. Whether this eﬀect in
itself can reduce the gap between the home’s ex ante and ex post optimal
policy in the sense obtained in this paper through the trade deﬂection eﬀect
will depend on the underlying economic conditions and can be further ex-
plored. In fact, at a broad level there will no harm in interpreting our trade
deﬂection eﬀect as form of tariﬀ complementarity eﬀect since the two play a
similar role in the context of this paper.
Fourthly, extending the model to non-linear demand functions will be
49an important and interesting avenue to further explore the nature and mag-
nitude of the eﬀects discussed above.
50Appendix
Appendix A1: Existence and uniqueness of the time-consistent equilibrium
prediction about home’s future equilibrium local (relative) price in the MFN
regime:
Proof: This is given by the value of pe that satisﬁes the following equation:
pe = p(t(f(pe)),t(f(pe)),f(pe))
Using the p(.) function given by equation (1) we can rewrite the previous
equation as:
pe = α − (λAxA + λBxB)+( 1− λ)t(f(pe)) − λf(pe) ......(A1.1)
From the factor market equilibrium outlined in section 2 we can see that f is
strictly bounded above by (R/L)1−b1 and bounded below by zero. Under the
interior solution condition that α is suﬃciently high so that world demand for
good X is higher than its supply when p is arbitrarily close to zero, it follows
that RHS of equation (A1.1) is strictly positive ∀pe > 0. Consequently, we
can ﬁnd suﬃciently small (close to zero) value of pe such that LHS of equation
(A1.1) is strictly smaller than its RHS. Similarly, since f is bounded above,
it follows that we can ﬁnd a suﬃciently high value of pe such that LHS of
equation (A1.1) is strictly higher than its RHS. Existence of the solution
value of pe follows from this and the fact that LHS and RHS of equation
(A1.1) are continuous in pe.
Uniqueness: Substituting for t(f(pe)) from equation (3) in RHS of equation
(A1.1) we can see that there are two possible cases which are as follows:
(i) when RHS is non-increasing in pe; that is, (1 − λ)β − 2λ ≤ 0, and (ii)
when RHS is strictly increasing in pe;t h a ti s ,(1 − λ)β − 2λ > 0. In case
(i) uniqueness of the solution is assured since in equation (A1.1) LHS is
strictly increasing while RHS is non-increasing in pe. F o rc a s e( i i )n o t et h a t
the second derivative of RHS with respect to pe is strictly negative due to
declining marginal productivity of labor in sector X. Given this concavity of
RHS, the uniqueness of the solution follows directly from the fact that there
exists an interval in the neighborhood of zero such that for any value of pe
51in this interval, LHS of equation (A1.1) is strictly smaller than RHS of the
same equation, and that the latter is strictly positive (due to the interior
solution condition stated in the proof above).
Q.E.D.
Appendix A2: Existence, uniqueness and stability of the time-consistent
tariﬀ (t∗
mfn) in the MFN regime.
Proof: The time-consistent equilibrium tariﬀ, t∗
mfn, is equal to the value of t
that satisﬁes the following condition:
t = t(f(pe(t,t))) ......(A2.1)
Consider RHS of the previous equation. This is uniquely determined for
any given value of t as proved in Appendix A3 below. Further, f(pe(te,t e)) is
bounded above and below as discussed in Appendix A1 above. From equation
(3) in section 2 it then follows that RHS of equation (A2.1) is bounded
above and below. The lower bound is strictly positive under the (interior
solution) condition that f<λf + λAxA + λBxB which follows from the
interior solution conditions speciﬁed in Appendix A5, part (i). The previous
inequality ensures that home is the natural importer of good X. That is,
under complete free trade home imports good X from each foreign country.
With a strictly positive lower bound on the value of RHS of equation (A2.1)
and the fact that RHS of the same equation is well deﬁned and unique, it
follows that there exists a suﬃciently small value of t such that RHS value
is strictly greater than the LHS. Similarly, since RHS of the equation is
bounded above it follows that there exists a suﬃciently large value of t such
that RHS value is smaller than LHS value. Existence of the time-consistent
tariﬀ follows from this and the fact that RHS and LHS of the equation (A2.1)
are continuous in t.
Uniqueness:W eh a v et w op o s s i b l ec a s e s :w h e nβ −λ ≤ 0 and when β −λ >
0. In the former case uniqueness of the time-consistent equilibrium follows
trivially since RHS of equation (A2.1) is non-increasing in t while LHS of
t h es a m ee q u a t i o ni ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nt. Now consider the latter case
when β −λ > 0. Uniqueness is ensured here by the fact that RHS is strictly
concave in t, strictly monotonically increasing in t and, as discussed above,
for arbitrarily small (close toz e r oa n dp o s i t i v e )v a l u e so ft RHS is strictly
positive and strictly greater than LHS.
52Stability:W h e nβ −λ > 0 then the stability of the (unique) time-consistent
tariﬀ follows directly from the fact that RHS of equation (A2.1) is strictly
concave in t. When β − λ ≤ 0 it can be seen that stability is ensured by the
fact that the absolute value of the ﬁrst derivative of RHS is strictly less than
one. That is, diﬀerentiating RHS of equation (A2.1) with respect to t we get
that the absolute value of this derivative is equal to
(1 − λ)(λ − β)f0
(1 + λf0)(1 + λ)
< 1.
This ensures the stability of the time-consistent MFN tariﬀ and hence the
equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables in the MFN regime.
Q.E.D.
Appendix A3: Existence and uniqueness of pe(te
A,t e
B) function.
As stated in section 2, pe is given by the solution to the following equation:
pe + λf(pe)=α − λAxA − λBxB + λAte
A + λBte
B
RHS of the previous equation is well deﬁned and its value is unique for any
arbitrary given values of te
A,t e
B. The value of LHS of the previous equation
is strictly and monotonically increasing in pe. This implies that the solution,
if it exists, must be unique. Under the interior solution condition that α
is suﬃciently high so that world demand for good X is higher than the
world supply of good X when local prices in all the three countries are zero,
it follows that the LHS is strictly less than the RHS for arbitrarily small
values of pe. Note that from the factor market equilibrium conditions stated
in section 2, f(pe) approaches zero as pe approaches zero. Next note that
RHS is bounded above for any given values of te
A,t e
B. Thus, we can ﬁnd a
value of pe such that LHS of the previous equation is strictly greater than
the LHS of the same. These properties, together with the fact that the LHS





B. Stability of the solution value is ensured by the fact that for
arbitrarily small value of pe, LHS of the previous equation is smaller than
RHS of the same equation, both are positive and that the LHS is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in pe.
Q.E.D.
53Appendix A4: Interior solution conditions for ˆ tmfn and ˆ tpta
(i) ˆ tmfn : Consider equation (7). Note that f +r2 > 0 under the assumption
that b1 < 1.S e tt =0in LHS of equation (7). It is straightforward to check
that with f + r2 > 0, LHS of equation (7) is strictly positive at t =0 . This
implies that ˆ tmfn must be strictly positive. Note that when b1 =1then
f + r2 =0and LHS of equation (7) is still strictly positive at t =0since
λ > 0.
Now consider a prohibitive MFN tariﬀ when production and wage rate is
endogenous to the tariﬀ announcement. By deﬁnition, at the prohibitive
tariﬀ, M =0 . Imposing this restriction it is easy to see that LHS of equation
( 7 )i ss t r i c t l yn e g a t i v ep r o v i d e dt h a tβ is not too large. We assume that this
holds throughout the model and is formally stated in Appendix (A5), part (ii)
below. With this holding, ˆ tmfn is strictly interior and it must satisfy equation
(7). Under these restrictions, the second order maximization condition is
guaranteed to hold (locally) at a value of t that satisﬁes equation (7).















At tB =0 , LHS of the previous equation is strictly positive since F +Lr2 > 0
as stated in part (i) above and the remaining terms are strictly positive under
the interior solution conditions stated in Appendix (A5), part (i) below.
This implies that ˆ tpta must be strictly positive. Further, it is evident from
the ﬁrst order condition above that if β is not too large then ˆ tpta will be
non-prohibitive since at a prohibitive external tariﬀ,L H So ft h eﬁrst order
condition speciﬁed above is strictly negative. The restriction on the value
of β is consistent with the interior solution condition speciﬁed in Appendix
(A5), part (ii) below. With this holding, the second order maximization
condition is guaranteed to hold at a value of tB that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
condition.
Q.E.D.
Appendix A5: Interior solution conditions
All our results are based on the assumption that the home country always
imports a strictly positive amount from each foreign country. Although our
basic results can be derived under weaker conditions too, however, the as-
sumption simpliﬁes the exposition of our ﬁndings. The following conditions
54are suﬃcient for strictly positive import-volumes in the sense stated above
for any given ﬁnite values of the parameters in the model:
(i) xB >x A > λf∗ + λAxA + λBxB where f∗ ≡ F(L)/L. This condition en-
sures that home’s import-volume from each foreign country is strictly positive
under complete free trade. Further, it ensures that t(f),t B(f) are strictly
positive ∀f.
(ii) We assume that β is not too large so that home’s politically optimal tariﬀ
is non-prohibitive. It can be easily checked that for suﬃciently small values




Appendix B1: Existence, uniqueness and stability of the time-consistent
tariﬀ in the PTA regime.
Proof: The proof of this follows the same logic as for the MFN regime in
Appendix A2. The only diﬀerence is that the interior solution conditions
here, while consistent with the ones for the MFN regime, are slightly more
strict. That is, we need to invoke the assumption made in section 3 that
xB >x A. This assumption ensures that home’s import-volume from country
B (the non-member country) is strictly positive in the PTA regime when its
external tariﬀ is arbitrarily small. This restriction along with the condition
that f<λf +λAxA +λBxB (discussed in Appendix A2) ensure that home’s
ex post optimal external tariﬀ in the PTA regime (given by equation (6) in
section 2) is strictly positive; ∆1 > 0 for all ﬁnite values of the parameters
in the model. The rest of the proof can now be seen by following exactly
the same steps as outlined for the proof in Appendix A2 and using the time-
consistency condition that te
B = tB(f(pe(0,t e
B))).
Q.E.D.
Appendix B2: In the MFN regime, the time-consistent tariﬀ is strictly
higher than the full commitment optimal tariﬀ.
Proof: This follows directly from the fact that the home government has an
incentive to surprise private agents with a strictly higher tariﬀ ex post since
r2 < 0 , f0 > 0 and that the time-consistent MFN tariﬀ is stable and unique.
Notice that
dr




dpe,w= peF0 and pe = q when
future tariﬀs are fully anticipated. From this it follows that the ﬁrst term in
55the equation for dr/dpe is equal to zero and the second term is strictly non-
zero implying that r2 < 0. For more details on the stability and uniqueness
of the time-consistent tariﬀ in the MFN regime, see Appendix A2.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B3: Proposition 2:
(i) A necessary condition for PTAs to be stumbling blocs is that the home
government faces commitment problem vis-a-vis its domestic private agents.
That is, ηmfn > 0.
(ii) There exists a critical values of λ,b 1 denoted by λ
∗,b ∗
1 ∈ (0,1) such that
∀λ ≤ λ
∗ and b1 ≥ b∗
1, t h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tp r e f e r sa nex ante commitment
to multilateral free trade (FTA regime) over no commitment (MFN regime).
That is, the second inequality in (9) holds.
Proof: (i) Note that in equation (7A), f + r2 > 0 given that b1 < 1. For
β,λ > 0 we have that ˆ tmfn > 0. This implies that ΩFC
MFN > ΩFTA. For PTAs
to be stumbling blocs the second inequality in (9) must hold. This will hold
only if ηmfn > 0,s i n c eΩFC
MFN > ΩFTA.
(ii) We establish the proof of this using limit-analysis.
Limit-analysis: We consider the limit-values of the endogenous variables
when b1 → 1 and λ → 0. For the latter we will assume that L,K,R are ﬁxed
and parametrically vary the value of LA + LB. Thus, as LA + LB →∞we
get λ → 0. Although not necessary for the proof here, it will be useful to
treat LB as ﬁxed and vary LA only. This will allow us to see easily that
the conditions required for Proposition 2a n dProposition 3t oh o l da r em e t
simultaneously. The proof involves the following steps:
(a) From the equation for pe in section 2.2, we note that pe is bounded
below. We assume that α is suﬃciently high so that the solution values of
pe and other endogenous variables in the limit are strictly interior. This
will be pointed out as we proceed. (b) From the factor market equilibrium





(L − Lx)1−b2 when 0 <





(L − Lx)1−b2. Now
assume that α is suﬃciently high so that the lower bound for the equilibrium
value of pe is strictly greater than b2(K/L)1−b2. Now take limits on both





(L − Lx)1−b2. Speciﬁcally, we get: limit
56(L − Lx)1−b2 = b2K1−b2(limit pe)−1. It is straightforward to see that the
limiting value of Lx must be strictly positive under the restriction that α
is suﬃciently high as stated above. This implies that f(pe) converges to
a strictly positive value. (c) Now consider the expression for r2 stated in
section 3. Impose the (time-consistent and full commitment) equilibrium
conditions that w = peF0 and p = pe = q(.). Taking limits on both sides of
the expression for r2L we get that limit r2 = −limit f(pe).
The rest of the proof follows simply from these limit-values. Taking limits
on both sides of equation (7A) we can see that ˆ tmfn → 0. From part (c)
above, the ﬁrst term on RHS of equation (7A) converges to zero and the
second term (pure welfare maximizing tariﬀ) converges to zero also, as λ
approaches zero. Since all our functions are continuous, it follows that as
ˆ tmfn → 0, ΩFC
MFN → ΩFTA. Since the time-consistent MFN tariﬀ must
be ex post optimal, it follows that it must satisfy equation (3). Taking
limits on both sides of equation (3) we get that t∗
mfn → β limit f(pe) > 0,
where the inequality follows from the results in part (b) of the proof. The
diﬀerence between the limiting values of ˆ tmfn and t∗
mfn implies that limit
(ΩFC
MFN − ΩTC
MFN)=limit ηmfn > 0. With our results that ΩFC
MFN → ΩFTA
and limit ηmfn > 0, the second inequality in (9) is guaranteed to hold in the
limit. From the deﬁnition of limits, it follows that ∃ λ
∗,b ∗
1 such that part (ii)
of the Proposition is satisﬁed.
Q.E.D.
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